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In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,' the United States Supreme
Court ruled that an employer's agreement with an employee providing for the
arbitration of statutory discrimination claims is enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)2 and thus precludes a lawsuit under such a statute,3 in this
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law. © 2011 Kenneth T. Lopatka. All
rights reserved.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
3. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 26, 35.
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case the Ae Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).4 In U-Haul Co. of
California, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)
essentially took for granted, with only a footnote explanation,6 that a claim under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7 alleging an unfair labor practice is
not governed by Gilmer. The issue that divided the Board panel in U-Haul was
whether employees reasonably would understand the language of the arbitration
agreement to cover unfair labor practice claims. 8  Although the arbitration
provision named other statutes, 9 which are enforceable by filing an action in
court, but not NLRA claims, which are not so enforceable; and although an
explanatory memo stated that the arbitration provision covered claims that courts
are authorized to entertain, 10 the panel majority was convinced that employees
reasonably would not interpret the memo's language literally." They ruled that
the arbitration agreement itself was unlawful.' Part I of this Article examines
the issue that the Board in U-Haul gave the back of its hand-whether it is
entitled to an exemption from the FAA and if so, why?
In that connection, Part I also explores whether the Board should take
account of the FAA's strong pro-arbitration policy, 13 even if it is not strictly
within its grip, and what is the basis for the Board's refusal to do so. The
answers to these questions inform the answer to a question that the Board and the
courts have not yet confronted. The lesson from U-Haul is that an employer
must make an exception for NLRA claims from an arbitration agreement that
covers all other statutory claims in order to save it from condemnation at the
hands of the Board. 14  Part II of this Article examines whether even that
exception saves the arbitration agreement. More specifically, because an
arbitration agreement that covers claims under labor and employment statutes
apart from the NLRA explicitly or implicitly bars class actions and, perhaps,
class grievances, does that bar run afoul of employees' NLRA right to engage in
"concerted activities"' 5 for their mutual aid or protection?
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
5. 347 N.L.R.B. 375 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
6. 347 N.L.R.B. at 378 n.1l.
7. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
8. See U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 377-78.
9. Id. at 377.
10. Id. at 377-78.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 377.
13. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (noting that the FAA
evinces a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
14. See U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 378.
15. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS COVERING UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CLAIMS
A. The Board's Dispatch of Gilmer
Relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Gilmer that employees who
have agreed to arbitrate their statutory discrimination claims remain free to file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),' 6 the
Board in U-Haul concluded that employees are unable to waive their right to file
unfair labor practice charges. 17 That reliance overlooks a significant difference
between the two kinds of charges. An EEOC charge simply triggers an
investigation and, perhaps, a conciliation effort, but does not begin the
adjudicatory process, which the EEOC lacks the authority to conduct." An
unfair labor practice charge does begin that process before the NLRB, an agency
that does have adjudicatory power.' Apart from the miniscule number of cases
in which the EEOC files suit in its own name,20 an EEOC charge results in an
adjudication of an employee's Title VII, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
or ADEA claim only if the employee files suit in federal or state court.21 Gilmer
held, however, that the FAA precludes the maintenance of such a suit on the
theory that if a party has clearly and unmistakably made an agreement to
arbitrate a statutory claim, "the party should be held to it unless Congress itself
16. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
17. U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 378 n.ll.
18. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (noting that "the
Commission [EEOC] cannot adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions").
19. See NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 F.2d 734, 735 (4th Cir. 1982).
20. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290 n.7 (2002) (citing Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation) (last visited Nov. 18,
2001), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html) (website no longer available); accord U.S.
EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY
2008, http://archive.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2009) (current website);
U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2008,
http://archive.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2009) (current website).
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over suits for the violation of these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825-26 (1990) (finding concurrent jurisdiction in Title
VII actions, similar to the ADEA); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 872 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Pa.
1994) (explaining that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over ADA suits); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(c)(1) (2006).
However, the FAA, enacted under and reaching to the full extent of Congress's commerce clause
power, preempts state law except insofar as 9 U.S.C. § 2 permits arbitration agreements to be
invalidated under state contract law principles applicable to any contract. Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272, 278, 281 (1995) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984)). How far a state can go in refusing to enforce arbitration agreements in the
name of its general contract law principles and still avoid FAA preemption is a complex question.
In general, if such a contract principle sufficiently frustrates arbitration's informality advantage, it is
preempted. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (explaining that
the FAA preempts California law conditioning enforceability of adhesion contracts on the
availability of class arbitrations).
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has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue." 22 An unfair labor practice charge, in contrast, does
result in the adjudication of an employee's statutory claim. Thus, an unfair
labor practice charge serves a function similar to a complaint in federal court. 24
From this perspective, the Board would be obliged to treat the agreement to
arbitrate as a reason to stay its adjudicative process.25
B. The Uncertainty of Congressional Intent Regarding NLRB Forum
Waivers
With respect to the exception for statutory claims for which Congress
26intended to preclude waivers of the usual forum, the indicia of congressional
intent regarding the NLRA are inconclusive. As sources of this often illusive
legislative intent, the Court has pointed to the text of a statute and its legislative
history, as well as any inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's
underlying purpose.27  Section 10(a) of the NLRA provides that the Board's
power to prevent unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,
law, or otherwise." 28  This language may-but need not-be interpreted to
preclude a forum waiver. Giving effect to a waiver of recourse to the Board in
favor of arbitration is not synonymous with depriving the Board of the power to
adjudicate the very same unfair labor practice claims that would be presented to
an arbitrator. Although the Supreme Court has observed that the Board depends
upon charges filed with it to be able to adjudicate unfair labor practices, 29 unlike
EEOC charges, which can be filed only by "a person claiming to be
aggrieved, 73there is no standing requirement or other eligibility limitation on
22. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
23. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 381 (2006) (Battista, Chairman, dissenting in
part) (stating that an unfair labor practice claim is made exclusively to the NLRB, an agency with
adjudicatory powers), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
24. See id.
25. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) (providing for the stay of court proceedings where any issue
therein is referable to arbitration).
26. See supra text accompanying note 22.
27. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009) (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
26-29) (The Gilmer Court's analysis of statutory text, legislative history, and purpose led it to
conclude that the ADEA does not preclude arbitration.); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Shearson/Am.
Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
28. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006).
29. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (quoting Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389
U.S. 235, 238 (1967)).
30. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). The
ADA incorporates this provision of Title VII regarding who can file a charge that the EEOC is
authorized to investigate, and also uses the phrase "person alleging discrimination on the basis of
disability." Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). In
reference to who may bring a civil action, the ADEA refers to "[a]ny person aggrieved," but
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who can file unfair labor practice charges. 31 Surprising as it may seem, the
Board's rules do not even require charging parties to have first-hand knowledge
of what they allege. 32 The EEOC is authorized to file its own charges, though it
infrequently does SO, 33 and the NLRB cannot. 34 Nevertheless, since anyone can
file an unfair labor practice charge, holding a party to his agreement to arbitrate
unfair labor practice claims does not disempower the Board from adjudicating
the unfair labor practice claim that goes to arbitration.
35
As indicative of congressional intent, the Board surely will point to
Congress's painstakingly crafted administrative enforcement mechanism.36 That
mechanism includes the separate General Counsel, who has the same political
qualifications as Board members, acts as the prosecutor, and is guided by the
public interest; 37 the five Board members, who serve staggered terms, are
nominated by the President, and, except for recess appointees, must be
confirmed by the Senate according to a bygone era's political compromise;
38
and, the administrative adjudication scheme, which is peculiar in various
respects including one-sided General-Counsel-only prehearing discovery,
39
separate trial and Board review stages, a standard notice-posting remedy, and
requires that a person must first file a charge with the EEOC indicating "the alleged unlawful
practice." Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1)-(d)(1)
(2006).
31. The NLRA contains no limitation on who can file a charge, providing instead,
"[w]henever it is charged." NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006). It is therefore not surprising
that the Board has found no standing requirement for filing a charge. See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc.,
229 N.L.R.B. 757, 765 (1977), enforced in relevant part, 587 F.2d 403,413 (9th Cir. 1978).
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1988); Green Valley Manor, L.L.C, 353 N.L.R.B. 905, 907
(2009). Of course, a party to an arbitration agreement may not evade the agreement simply by
enlisting an agent to file a charge with the Board. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1494
n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Consol. Freightways Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1252, 1255 (1988)).
Presumably, therefore, anyone except an agent of an employee contractually obligated to arbitrate
could bring the same issue to the Board, so the universe of potential charge filers remains
expansive.
33. See supra note 20.
34. Hosp. & Serv. Emps. Union, Local 399 v. NLRB, 798 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing NLRB v. Inland Empire Meat Co., 611 F.2d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 1979)). See also NLRA
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (providing that the NLRB may issue a complaint when an unfair labor
practice has been charged).
35. See Lewis, 229 N.L.R.B. at 764-65.
36. See Organization Chart, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are/organizational-chart (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
37. See NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006); The General Counsel, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/general-counsel (last visited Aug. 31, 2011);
What We Do, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last visited
Aug. 31, 2011).
38. NLRA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a); See The Board, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
39. See In Re Offshore Mariners United, 338 N.L.R.B. 745, 746 (2002).
40. The NLRB Process, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb-
process (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
41. See NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
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the availability of judicial review in--coupled with the Board's need for
enforcement of its orders by-an appellate court.42 In sum, Congress could not
have intended unfair labor practice claims to be submitted to arbitration, which is
a different sort of proceeding hallmarked by informality, greater procedural
neutrality, and lack of a political mission, or so the argument goes.
The Supreme Court, however, necessarily and repeatedly has rejected
similar arguments regarding procedural protections attendant on a judicial forum
prescribed for enforcing statutory rights, including more extensive discovery,
jury trials, and far more rigorous judicial review, all of which are sacrificed by
enforcing agreements to arbitrate.4 3 The Court has also rejected the argument
that arbitration would frustrate an administrative agency's role in the statutory
enforcement scheme. 44 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) role in enforcing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is critical to effectuating the congressional design, yet the SEC's key
policy-making function does not preclude enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
claims under those statutes.45 The Board probably perceives its role in the
NLRA scheme as more critical than that of the SEC, but that perception is
counterbalanced by its willingness to defer to a collectively bargained arbitration
process, as explained below.
The Taft-Hartley amendment of the NLRA embodies a strong pro-arbitration
policy, albeit for arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining
agreements. 46 In the so-called Steelworkers trilogy and its progeny, the Supreme
Court repeatedly emphasized the strength and breadth of this policy. 47  The
42. See NLRA § 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f); NLRB Process, supra note 40.
43. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29-31 (citing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 634 (1985));
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978) (confirming that ADEA claimants have the right to a
jury trial).
44. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29.
45. See id. at 29.
46. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 206(d), 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 173(d),
185(a) (2006).
47. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (explaining
that reviewing arbitration awards on the merits would undermine the pro-arbitration federal policy);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (stating that
"[a]n order to arbitrate.., should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute"); United
Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); see also E. Associated Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (citing Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at
596) (refusing to set aside arbitration award despite strong public-safety challenge); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987) (discussing the reasons for
insulating arbitral decisions from most public policy challenges); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1974) ("[T]he 'presumption of arbitrability' announced in the
Steelworkers trilogy applies to safety disputes .... "); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v.
Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1972) (explaining the arbitrability of procedural issue
extrinsic to agreement under arbitration clause that covers "any difference" between the parties).
[VOL. 63: 43
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Board itself has long recognized the strong statutory policy reasons for deferring
unfair labor practice claims to arbitration, even when filed by individuals
complaining of unlawful reprisals.48 The Board also defers to arbitrators'
awards, even when it would have decided the underlying statutory issue, which
often turns on motive, differently. 49 These cases involve collectively bargained
arbitration procedures, but they militate against a conclusion that there is an
inherent contradiction between arbitration and the NLRA' s underlying purpose.
C. The FAA's Judicial, Not Administrative, Focus
Despite the uncertainty of congressional intent, for several reasons the Board
almost certainly is not bound to honor an individual employee's agreement to
arbitrate unfair labor practice claims. Preliminarily, these reasons have nothing
to do with any assessment of the relative importance of the Board's statutory
mission or the indispensability of its supposed "cumulative institutional expertise
in administering the Act." It would be unprincipled and irreducibly
subjective-if not arrogant-for the Board to suggest that although an arbitrator
is capable of resolving Title VII, Section 1981, ADEA, ADA, Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and other statutory claims in the
employment arena l-not to mention, among others, Sherman Act, Securities
48. See United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984) (explaining that where the parties
have a collectively bargained arbitration agreement, "it is contrary to the basic principles of the Act
for the Board to jump into the fray" before an attempt to arbitrate); Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d
1486, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussing the NLRB's deferral policy).
49. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 577 (1984); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082
(1955). The NLRB's Acting General Counsel (AGC) announced that he will urge the Board to
tighten the deferral standard articulated in Olin so that an arbitrator's award will warrant deferral
only if: (a) the contract term at issue incorporates the relevant statutory right or the parties present
the statutory issue to the arbitrator, and (b) "the arbitrator correctly enunciated the applicable
statutory principles and applied [those principles] in deciding the [statutory] issue." Memorandum
GC 11-05 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to all Reg'l Dirs., Officers-in-
Charge, and Resident Officers, Guideline Memorandum Concerning Deferral to Arbitral Awards
and Grievance Settlements in Section 8(a)(1) and (3) Cases 6-7 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at
https://www.nlrb.gov/publications/general-counsel-memos. That does not mean that the arbitrator's
application of the statutory principles must yield the same outcome the Board itself would have
reached. The AGC will not urge any change in the existing standard, whereby the arbitrator's
award warrants deferral so long as it is not "clearly repugnant" to the Act or "palpably erroneous."
Id.
50. See Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69, 69 (1988), enforced in part sub nom.
Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
51. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 21 (1991) involved an ADEA
claim but as the Court indicated in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001),
the Gilmer rationale applies more generally and requires the arbitration of federal statutory
discrimination claims. Lower courts have enforced arbitration agreements against all types of
federal statutory discrimination claims as well as claims under other federal employment statutes.
See, e.g., Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 10-10809, 2011 WL 4425288, at *13 (11th Cir.
Sept. 23, 2011) (Jones Act and Seaman's Wage Act); Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d
7
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Exchange Act of 1934, Securities Act of 1933, Truth in Lending Act, and civil
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, 52 all claims
fraught with public policy and ones that Congress commissioned the judiciary to
resolve with full discovery and procedural protections, including jury trials-
arbitrators are not equal to the task of resolving unfair labor practice issues
because they occasionally feature important social implications.
53
The first reason why an arbitration agreement does not preclude the filing of
unfair labor practice claims resides in the text and purpose of the FAA. The
FAA's procedural dictates focus on the relationship of the courts to private
parties' agreements to arbitrate. For example, § 3 requires a stay, upon
application of one of the parties, "of any suit or proceeding... brought in any of
the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration."54 The
FAA does not authorize stays of administrative proceedings 55 or give federal
courts a jurisdictional basis to do so. 56 Section 4 authorizes the federal district
courts to compel delinquent parties to honor agreements to arbitrate. 7 Section 9
empowers federal courts to confirm arbitration awards,58 and §§ 10 and 11
authorize those courts to vacate and to modify or correct such awards, albeit on
672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006) (Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)); Carter v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2004) (FLSA); EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (Title VII); Miller v. Pub.
Storage Mgmt. Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1997) (ADA); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115
F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 1997) (FMLA); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877,
883-84 (9th Cir. 1992) (Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA)); Bird v. Shearson
Lehman/Am. Exp., Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (ERISA); Williams v. Katten, Muchin &
Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1443 (N.D. I11. 1993) (§ 1981).
52. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000) (Truth in
Lending Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1989)
(Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40 (1985) (Sherman Act); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366,
378-79 (3d Cir. 2000) (Truth in Lending Act and Electronic Fund Transfer Act); see also Oldroyd
v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1998) (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989).
53. In Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28), the Court stated that
even claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated
[provided] . . . 'the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum."' Id. (second alteration in original).
54. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
55. See Oxford Med. Grp., P.C. v. Vossoughian, 154 F. Supp, 2d 782, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes, Inc. v. Csaky, 427 F. Supp. 814, 819 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)).
56. E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.9 (1984) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)) (stating that the FAA creates
substantive federal law but is not an independent basis for federal jurisdiction); Greenberg v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is well-settled that the FAA does not confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts even though it creates federal substantive law.").
57. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
58. Id. § 9.
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very limited grounds.59 These provisions do not address what a federal court can
do vis-d-vis an administrative agency or what an administrative agency can or
must do in relation to an arbitration agreement or award.60 The Supreme Court's
comment in Gilmer-that an employee who is a party to an arbitration
agreement remains free to file an EEOC charge 61 -simply may reflect the
FAA's focus on the federal courts' relationship to private parties' arbitration
agreements.
Second, although an unfair labor practice charge triggers the NLRA's62.
adjudicatory process, it is not the exact equivalent of a complaint filed with a
court.63 A private individual's filing of an unfair labor practice charge does not
result in the Board's adjudication of issues framed by the charge unless the
General Counsel, a statutorily separate part of the NLRB, decides after an
investigation to issue a complaint, which he has unreviewable discretion whether
or not to do.64 From this perspective, an unfair labor practice charge resembles
an EEOC charge because it precipitates an investigation and a possible
settlement effort. It is unlike an EEOC charge, which the aggrieved person
virtually always must follow by initiating a lawsuit to obtain relief.65 Here, the
filer of an unfair labor practice charge need not initiate another proceeding to
obtain relief; instead, the General Counsel will initiate an unfair labor practice
proceeding by issuing a complaint, and the General Counsel is not a party to the
agreement to arbitrate. The Supreme Court has held that the EEOC may sue in
its own name under the federal antidiscrimination statutes and obtain even
monetary relief on behalf of an individual bound by an agreement to arbitrate
because the EEOC is not a party to that agreement. 66 The NLRB General
Counsel would seem to stand on the same footing when he issues a complaint
and seeks relief from the Board.
Because Board orders are not binding unless and until they are enforced by a
United States Court of Appeals, the Board must enlist the aid of the courts to
enforce a decision that disregards the parties' agreement to arbitrate the issues
the decision resolves. 67  Nevertheless, the FAA does not apply to this
enforcement decision. The FAA's procedural provisions are addressed to federal
district courts not courts of appeals. Section 3 of the FAA refers to "any suit or
59. Id. §§ 10-11.
60. See generally id. §§ 3-4, 9-11 (focusing on the relationship of courts to parties'
arbitration agreements).
61. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
62. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(b) (2006).
63. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
64. See NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (describing the General Counsel's powers and
duties); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
65. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
66. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288 (2002) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of
Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980)).
67. See NLRA § 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f).
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proceeding brought in any of the courts of the United States, 68 and the NLRB's
petition for enforcement filed in a court of appeals is a proceeding brought in a
court of the United States. However, § 3 goes on to say that if the issue is
arbitrable, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had." 69  Courts of appeals do not try
actions, and by the time the Board petitions such a court for enforcement of its
order, a stay of the arbitration would come far too late to serve the intended
purpose of giving the parties the benefit of their agreement to avoid litigation in
favor of more expeditious arbitration. More importantly, the Board is not a party
to the agreement to arbitrate, so when, through the General Counsel, it files a
petition for enforcement, it stands in the same nonparty posture as the EEOC.
70
Third, from a broader policy perspective, the purpose of the FAA is "to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and
to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."
7'
Although, perhaps also deserving of attention, administrative agencies' hostility
toward arbitration was not one of the evils at which Congress was aiming. 72 No
such hostility existed under English common law, and the few administrative
agencies that existed in 1925,73 when the FAA was first enacted,74 could not
have manifested any hostility to arbitration worthy of congressional attention.
D. The Board and the FAA's Strong Pro-Arbitration Policy
Although the indicia of congressional intent whether to preclude waiver of
the NLRB as a forum in favor of arbitration are not conclusive, the FAA's
failure to address the arbitration of claims to be litigated before administrative
agencies,75 like the NLRB, means that the Board almost certainly is not required
to honor an agreement between an employer and an employee to submit unfair
labor practice claims to arbitration. The absence of a requirement, however,
does not mean that the Board must or should ignore the "liberal federal policy
68. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying note 66.
71. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 & n.4 (1974)); see Allied-Bruce Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71
(1995) ("First, the basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to
enforce agreements to arbitrate.").
72. See generally Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 ("[Plassage of the Act was
motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties
had entered.").
73. A Brief History of Administrative Government, OMB WATCH (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3461 (discussing the history of administrative agencies).
74. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
75. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) ('The FAA does not mention
enforcement by public agencies .... ).
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favoring arbitration agreements., 76 Section 10(a) of the NLRA authorizes the
Board to cede its jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair labor practice cases, except in
certain industries, to state or territorial labor agencies that a~ply statutes and
interpretive standards consistent with those of the NLRA. An arbitrator
authorized to decide unfair labor practice claims similarly would apply the
standards the Board applies, vacillating though some of those standards may be.
The jurisdictional cession portion of § 10(a), like the ADEA's provision for
concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts78 -mentioned in Gilmer as
supportive of the arbitration of ADEA claimS7-suggests that deference to
arbitration is compatible with the NLRA's statutory scheme.
The procedural provisions of the FAA address the relationship between
federal courts and parties to an arbitration agreement, 80 but § 2, the FAA's
"primary substantive provision," 81 mandates that written arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract., 82 Section 2 of the FAA
bespeaks federal policy no less than the Norris-LaGuardia Act's § 3, which
makes so-called "yellow dog" contracts unenforceable and contrary to public
policy.83 Nearly seventy years ago, the Supreme Court cautioned that "the Board
has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act
so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important
Congressional objectives.
'" 84
When the agreement to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims is contained in
a collective bargaining agreement, as noted above, the Board has decided that it
will not resolve the unfair labor practice claim itself but will defer the claim to
arbitration even when the claim alleges the unlawful discharge or discipline of an
employee. 85 When the arbitrator renders an award on the merits of such a claim,the Board will defer to the award even if the Board would have decided the issue
76. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006).
78. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1).
79. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 483 (1989)).
80. See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
81. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
82. Id. at 24-25 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
84. S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
85. See United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984). The Board, however, will not
defer § 8(a)(1) or (a)(3) claims to arbitration when they are joined with a § 8(a)(4) claim that alleges
retaliation for initiating or participating in a Board proceeding. Int'l Harvester Co., 271 N.L.R.B.
647, 647 (1984); see also Filmation Assocs., 277 N.L.R.B. 1721, 1721-22 (1977) (allowing no
deference to arbitration if the alleged violations of § 8(a)(3) and (a)(1) are "closely intertwined"
with § 8(a)(4) allegations). But see Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 966 F.2d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 1992);
NLRB v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712, 721-22 (1st Cir. 1979).
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differently. 86 Arguably, the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA warrants a similar
deferential approach to employer agreements with individual employees to
arbitrate unfair labor practice claims.
Instead, the Board takes a radically different approach. It declares such
agreements to be unlawful. 87 This approach is extraordinary in comparison both
to judicial treatment of agreements to arbitrate other statutory claims and to the
traditional standards for what constitutes, and is the effect of, an illegal contract.
Under the FAA, if an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims satisfies state law
standards of unconscionability, fraud, or duress, which are applicable to any
contract, it becomes unenforceable-not unlawful. 88 Similarly, if the agreement
does not permit effective vindication of the statutory rights, such as by limiting
the remedies available under the statute, it may be found unenforceable, not
illegal. 89 It does not violate the underlying statute to enter into or maintain in
effect such a contract. Under traditional contract law principles, a contract
typically is illegal if it calls for the performance of an unlawful act or results
from an illegal act, such as collusive bidding.91 There is nothing unlawful about
taking a statutory claim to arbitration, and the agreement to do so is not the result
of any illegal conspiracy. Under the same contract principles, an agreement's
illegality does not always mean that it is unenforceable; depending on the
92remedy sought and on equitable considerations, it still may be enforceable.
86. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (stating that an arbitrator's award will not be
disturbed unless it is "clearly repugnant" to the Act).
87. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
88. See, e.g., Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable under California law), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011);
Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding an arbitration
agreement unenforceable because it was unconscionable under Virgin Islands law); Ticknor v.
Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding an arbitration agreement
unenforceable because it was unconscionable under general Montana contract law).
89. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 672-73 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding an arbitration agreement provision limiting remedies unenforceable because it undermines
Title Vl's remedial and deterrent purposes); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895
(9th Cir. 2002) (same); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th Cir.
1998) (same). If a damages limitation is ambiguous, however, whether it actually curbs an
arbitrator's authority to award statutory damages is a determination to be made by an arbitrator.
PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 (2003); Soto-Fonalledas v. Ritz-Carton San
Juan Hotel Spa & Casino, 640 F.3d 471, 476-78 (1st Cir. 2011).
90. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 675 (explaining that because the remedies provision was
severable from the contract, the entire contract was not unenforceable or unlawful).
91. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77-79 (1982) ("There is no
statutory code of federal contract law, but our cases leave no doubt that illegal promises will not be
enforced in cases controlled by the federal law."); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 649 (1899)
(discussing the illegal nature of a collusive bidding contract); Fitzsimons v. Eagle Brewing Co., 107
F.2d 712, 713 (3d Cir. 1939) (same).
92. See, e.g., Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that California
courts may give force to contracts that are illegal in some aspects).
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The Board is not content with unenforceability, invariable or circumstantial.
Nothing short of illegality and a sanction suffices.
93
E. The Board's Rationale for Condemning Agreements to Arbitrate Unfair
Labor Practice Claims
The Board's quite different approach, whereby the making of an agreement
to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims is unlawful, rests on three premises.
First, the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board is a substantive
right, contained in § 7 of the NLRA, 94 not simply the initial procedural step in
the enforcement process. Second, because § 8(a)(1) prohibits coercion, restraint
or interference with employees' exercise of § 7 rights, 95 it reaches further than
§ 8(a)(4), which, like other statutory bans on retaliation or discrimination for
recourse to the statutory enforcement mechanism, outlaws emplo Zer reprisals for
instituting or participating in the Board's enforcement process. 96 That further
reach extends the scope of illegality to employer rules or policies that are
"overbroad" and thereby "chill" employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. Third,
when an employer conditions employment on an individual employee's
agreement to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims, the Board may disregard the
agreement and treat the arbitration requirement like any chilling rule or policy
the employer implements.97  Each of these premises deserves careful
examination.
1. The § 7 Right to File Charges with the Board, § 8(a)(4)'s Ban on
Retaliation, and the Derivative Violation of§ 8(a)(1)
With regard to the first premise-that § 7 contains the right to file an unfair
labor practice charge-§ 7 mentions no such right.98 Section 10(b) describes thefiling of an unfair labor practice charge as the first step in the Board's
93. See Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69, 72-73 (1988), enforced in part sub nom.
Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
94. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
95. Id. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
96. Id. NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony" under the Act. Id. This prohibition understandably has been
interpreted to ban other kinds of reprisals for other forms of employee participation in Board
enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 125 (1972) (finding that
§ 8(a)(4) prohibits retaliation for giving a statement at the request of Board agent investigating
someone else's charge); Romar Refuse Removal, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 658, 670-71 (1994) (finding
that § 8(a)(4) prohibits reduction in work schedule as well as physical battery); Isla Verde Hotel
Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 496, 509-10 (1981) (finding that § 8(a)(4) prohibits revocation of an
agreement condoning misconduct), enforced, 702 F.2d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 1983).
97. See NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425
(1968).
98. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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enforcement process, 99 but § 7 is the NLRA's repository of employee rights.
Section 8(a)(4) prohibits an employer from taking out any reprisal against an
employee for filing a charge with the Board or participating in enforcement
proceedings.1°° Employment statutes of more recent vintage contain provisions,
like § 10(b), describing employees' opportunity to initiate the enforcement
proceedings by filing a charge, and like § 8(a)(4), forbidding discrimination for
initiating or participating in enforcement proceedings.' 0' In the other statutes,
however, these two provisions are sufficient to prevent the full range of reprisals
Congress intended to condemn, and no purpose would have been served by
adding another provision to make filing a charge a substantive right.
The peculiar structure of the NLRA presented the Board with the
opportunity to go further and create a substantive right in § 7. The prohibitions
on employer unfair labor practices in § 8(a) are framed as different species of
employer conduct that violate rights lodged in § 7; the more particularized
species of employer conduct described in § 8(a)(2)-(a)(5) also fall within the
broad general language in § 8(a)(1), thereby constituting so-called "derivative
violations" of § 8(a)(l).1 0 2 The pertinent structural key is that all proscribed
employer conduct is condemned because it infringes on the substantive
employee rights housed in § 7.103 From this perspective, it is consistent with the
Act's structure for the Board to find a § 7 right to file unfair labor practice
charges that § 8(a)(4), and derivatively § 8(a)(1), forbid employers from
retaliating against employees for filing. 104
The § 7 right to file charges with the Board is not surprising from another
perspective. It is well established that the general language in § 7 includes
employees' right to file charges with the EEOC and other agencies, and their
right to file a lawsuit so long as the requirements of concertedness and mutual• • • 105
aid or protection are satisfied. It would be difficult to treat the filing of an
unfair labor practice charge less favorably.
99. Id. NLRA § 10(b), § 160(b).
100. Id. NLRA § 8(a)(4), § 158(a)(4).
101. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(d),
626(b) (2006); Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(b), 2607(b) (2006);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 5(b) (2006);
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12203(a), 12117(a) (2006).
102. See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983); NLRB v. Centra, Inc.,
954 F.2d 366, 367 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)); G. Heileman Brewing
Co. v. NLRB, 879 F.2d 1526, 1533 (7th Cir. 1989); Fun Striders, Inc. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 659, 661
(9th Cir. 1981).
103. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
104. See id. NLRA § 8(a)(1), (a)(4), § 158(a)(1), (a)(4).
105. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1978) ("[Tjhe 'mutual aid or
protection clause' [of § 7] protects employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek to
improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums .... "); Frank
Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 950, 952 (3d Cir. 1981) (under the circumstances filing of
EEOC charge was protected, concerted activity, and Title VII does not provide the exclusive
remedy for retaliation), aff'g 247 N.L.R.B. 13 (1980); U Ocean Palace Pavilion, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B.
[VOL. 63: 43
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss1/4
20111 INTERPLAY BETWEEN FEDERAL LABOR AND ARBITRATION LAWS 57
If filing an unfair labor practice charge were treated the same way as filing
EEOC charges and lawsuits related to workplace treatment, it would not
necessarily qualify as protected, concerted activity. Under the constructive
concert theory adopted in Alleluia Cushion Co.,1° 6 the Board found concerted
activity when a single employee acted alone in filing a charge or lawsuit if the
statute invoked was enacted to benefit workers generally, 17 as all employment-
related statutes are. When the Board overruled Alleluia Cushion Co. and its
progeny in Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers 1),108 it adopted on remand, following
judicial disagreement that the overruling was statutorily required rather than
permitted, the traditional standard for concertedness'°9 framed by the Third
Circuit in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB." ° Under that traditional
standard, a single person's filing a charge with an administrative agency or a
lawsuit in court does not qualify as concerted unless it was filed with or on the
authority, even if implicit, of other employees."'
Unlike a charge filed with the EEOC or some other agency, or a complaint
filed in federal court, however, an unfair labor practice charge may constitute
concerted activity irrespective of whether more than one employee collaborates
in its framing or filing, whether it is filed with the implicit authorization of at
least one other employee, or whether the filer is simply seeking a financial
1162, 1162, 1170 (2005) (citing Le Madri Rest., 331 N.L.R.B. 269, 275 (2000); Trinity Trucking &
Materials Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 364, 365, supp., 227 N.L.R.B. 792 (1977), enforced, 567 F.2d 391 (7th
Cir. 1977)); Triangle Tool & Eng'g, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1357 n.5 (1976).
106. 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975), overruled by Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers 1), 268
N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984).
107. Id.
108. 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
109. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers 11), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
110. 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
111. Id. In Parexel International, LLC., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (Jan. 28, 2011), and
Continental Group, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (Aug. 11, 2011), the Board created two exceptions to
the principle that an individual's solitary action does not meet the concerted activity threshold for §
7 protection. In Parexel, one employee had discussed the subject of a wage increase with a
coworker-obviously concerted activity-although perhaps not for mutual aid or protection. 356
N.L.R.B. No. 82, slip op. at 1. The Board went out of its way to assume that the individual was not
engaged in concerted activity, but found her discharge unlawful anyway on the theory that the
employer's motivation was to prevent future instances of protected, concerted activity. Id., slip op.
at 4. It remains to be seen how far the Board will use this so-called "preemptive strike" theory to
erode the Myers Il/Mushroom Transportation analytical framework. See id., slip op. at 3. In
Continental Group, the Board avowedly embraced the notion that conduct can be "protected but not
"concerted." 357 N.L.R.B. No. 39, slip op. at 5. According to the Board, if an employee's solitary
conduct "touches the concerns animating Section 7 (e.g. conduct that seeks higher wages) but is not
protected by the Act because it is not concerted," the Board will confer protection nonetheless in
cases where the employer disciplines that employee for breaching an overbroad rule. Id. The scope
of "concerns animating Section 7" is uncertain, but it doubtfully can be confined to quests for
higher wages and may well extend to any sought-after improvement in compensation or working
conditions.
15
Lopatka: A Critical Perspective on the Interplay between Our Federal Labor
Published by Scholar Commons, 2011
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 63:43
benefit for herself alone.112 In other words, the filing of another kind of charge
or lawsuit must meet the Meyers Il/Mushroom Transportation test113 for
concertedness, but the filing of an unfair labor practice charge does not. 14
Rather, when a single employee acting on his own accord files an unfair
labor practice charge, the charge will meet the § 7 concerted activity requirement
if the allegation claims some form of reprisal or disadvantage for engaging in
protected concerted activity. 1 5  Presumably the underlying theory posits that
such a charge-the statutorily prescribed method of vindicating the right to
engage in the underlying protected, concerted activity-becomes a remedial• • • 116
extension of such activity. To be sure, this approach may smack of a
constructive concert theory akin to that the Board espoused in Alleluia Cushion
Co." 7 but rejected in Meyers I & ,.11 8 Its application, however, is limited to
unfair labor practice charges, and it conforms to the language of § 8(a)(4), which
forbids retaliation "against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under this subchapter."
9
2. The Independent and Different Violation of§ 8(a)(1)
At this juncture in the analysis, the structure of the NLRA and the
impossibility of differentiating in terms of coverage between the filing of EEOC
charges and federal lawsuits, on the one hand, and unfair labor practice charges,
on the other, support the inclusion of the latter among § 7's rights. That
proposition, however, does not, without more, lead to the conclusion that
agreements to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims are per se unenforceable,
112. See Prill, 835 F.2d at 1483.
113. See Meyers 11, 281 N.L.R.B. at 884; Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685.
114. See NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 422
(1968).
115. Id.
116. See Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702, 706 (3d
Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 418, 428 (1968). Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter." National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006). This provision seems to dispense with the
requirements of concertedness and mutual aid or protection. However, according to traditional
theory, § 8(a)(2)-(a)(5) are particularized ways in which an employer can-in the language of
§ 8(a)(1)-coerce, restrain or interfere with the exercise of § 7 rights, so the § 7 condition somehow
must be satisfied. See id. NLRA §8 7, 8(a)(1)-(4), §§ 157, 158(a)(1)-(4). It remains unclear
whether an employer can probe beneath the face of a charge in an attempt to show that the
allegation of underlying concerted activity is spurious and that § 7 does not protect the activity the
charge is supposed to remedially vindicate.
117. 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975), overruled by Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984).
118. Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d
941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), on remand, Meyers 11, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
119. NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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much less unlawful. 120  Section 8(a)(4) plainly prohibits virtually any
conceivable form of employer reprisal for exercising the § 7 right to file an
unfair labor practice charge. 21  An agreement to arbitrate such charges,
however, is not a form of reprisal. By its terms, § 8(a)(4) forbids discharging or
otherwise discriminating against an employee "because he has filed charges or
given testimony under this subchapter."'122 The phrase "because he has filed,"
makes the employer's motive for the adverse action, and the causal connection
between the adverse action and the employer's hostile motive, essential elements
of the violation. 123  The Board's dialectic for finding agreements to arbitrate
unfair labor practice claims unlawful depends on constructing an independent
and different violation of § 8(a)(1), even though § 8(a)(4) specifically addresses
the filing of unfair labor practice charges. 24 Interestingly, the Supreme Court
specifically reserved the question of whether a violation of § 8(a)(4) also
constitutes a violation of § 8(a)(1). 125 Under the derivative violation theory, the
120. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
121. See, e.g., Romar Refuse Removal, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 658, 669-70 (1994) (prohibiting
change of status, reduction in work schedule, assault, or discharge); Key Food Stores Coop., 286
N.L.R.B. 1056, 1057 (1987) (prohibiting the threat to discharge and an employer's retaliation of
initiating an arbitration proceeding); Clark & Hinojosa, 247 N.L.R.B. 710, 710 n.1 (1980) (reneging
on post-termination promise to pay additional severance pay in response to employee threat of filing
charge); Pinter Bros., Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 575, 575 (1977) (prohibiting the denial of bonuses and
wage increases, layoffs, refusal to reinstate, and offer of reemployment in more onerous jobs);
Burris Indus., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 91, 91 n.2, 96 (1975) (reprimand).
122. NLRA § 8(a)(4), § 158(a)(4).
123. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 831 F.2d 112, 116-18 (6th Cir.
1987) (stating that the "critical issue is the employer's actual motivation" and that the burden of
proof is on the employer to show permissible motivation (quoting NLRB v. Price's Pic-Pac
Supermarkets, Inc., 707 F.2d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Overseas Motor, Inc., 721 F.2d
570, 571 (6th Cir. 1983))); Vokas Provision Co. v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 864, 871 n.10 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[A] section 8(a)(4) violation ordinarily requires a finding of adverse action plus discriminatory
intent .... ); Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 734 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted) (insufficient
basis for finding § 8(a)(4) violation that discharge was "motivated in part" by charge filing;
violation requires finding supported by substantial evidence that proffered permissible reason was
pretext and that "real motive" was charge filing). Western Clinical Laboratory, 225 N.L.R.B. 725,
726 (1976), enforced in part, 571 F.2d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 1978), may be the only decision finding a
violation of § 8(a)(4) irrespective of an employer's motive, but it contains no explanation for that
linguistic tour deforce and seems to be aberrational. In this case, the employer, without knowledge
of the underlying reason for the employee's absence, charged an employee vacation time, or at least
failed to give the employee a sufficient opportunity to use unpaid leave time, when he was absent
pursuant to a subpoena to testify in a Board hearing. Id. at 725. The Board concluded that this
employer action amounted to coercion or restraint-the language used in § 8(a)(1)-regardless of
the employer's motive, and branded the violation as one of § 8(a)(4) as well. Id. at 726. The Ninth
Circuit enforced the Board's order, but did not explain how the employer could have violated
§ 8(a)(4) absent a retaliatory motive or even knowledge of the reason for the employee's absence.
Western Clinical, 571 F.2d at 459.
124. See Util. Vault Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 79, 82 (2005); Donn Prods., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 116,
121 (1977).
125. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 125 (1972); see NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Local
876, 570 F.2d 586, 588 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978).
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answer seems to be that it does, but only if the § 8(a)(1) transgression mirrors the
§ 8(a)(4) violation. 126 If no § 8(a)(4) violation arises because the employer has
not retaliated or threatened to retaliate, the violation of § 8(a)(1) depends on
whether that subsection has a broader and independent scope in relation to filing
unfair labor practice charges. 127
The proposition that § 8(a)(1) applies independently to the filing of unfair
labor practice charges gains support, once again, from the structure of the Act.
The subsections in § 8(b) prohibit a series of union unfair labor practices, but
they do not include a counterpart to § 8(a)(4). 128 Consequently, unless union
retaliation independently violates § 8(b)(1)(A)-which makes it unlawful for a
union "to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7], 'd29 the counterpart to § 8(a)(1) ("interfere with,
restrain, or coerce") 130 -the Act would not prohibit union reprisals against
employees for filing unfair labor practice charges against the unions. That result
is obviously intolerable, and the Supreme Court so ruled long ago in NLRB v.
Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers (Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers). 3' If retaliation for filing an unfair labor practice charge violates
§ 8(b)(1)(A), it also must violate the similar and somewhat broader language in
§ 8(a)(1). 132  Because, however, the violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) consisted of
retaliatory conduct, no more than a violation of counterpart § 8(a)(1)-which is
derivative of a violation of § 8(a)(4)-is needed to reach such conduct when
committed by an employer.' 
33
The Board may argue that a hypothetical rule that flatly forbids filing unfair
labor practice charges has to violate § 8(a)(1) and that § 8(a)(1), therefore,
necessarily has a broader purview than § 8(a)(4). However, that argument is
flawed and does not justify condemning arbitration agreements on any theory
that § 8(a)(1) goes beyond § 8(a)(4) in relation to the filing of unfair labor
practice charges.134 A flat ban on filing unfair labor practice charges with the
126. See Chinese Daily News, 346 N.L.R.B. 906, 933 (2006).
127. See Bill's Electric, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 292, 295 (2007). In Bill's Electric, the Board
found that an attorney's letter to noncompliant employees regarding their obligation under a
mandatory arbitration policy was unlawful and violated § 8(a)(4), even though it permitted the
employees to file unfair labor practice charges, because it also required them to arbitrate such
claims. Id. at 296. The letter qualified as a threat of retaliation because the policy was attached to
it, and the policy included the reprisal of having to reimburse the employer for its litigation
expenses if it obtained a stay of the Board proceeding in favor of arbitration. Id.
128. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(4)-(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)-(b)(7)
(2006).
129. Id. NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), § 158(b)(1)(A).
130. Id. NLRA § 8(a)(1), § 158(a)(1).
131. 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968).
132. See Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616, 620-21 (D.C. Cir.
1960), affd, 366 U.S. 731, 740 (1961).
133. See Chinese Daily News, 346 N.L.R.B. 906, 933 (2006).
134. See id. ("[Alny violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act is also a derivative
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.").
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Board is unlawful because it carries an implicit threat of discipline for recourse
to the Board, and for that reason easily violates § 8(a)(4). 35 If it also violates
§ 8(a)(1), it does so on a derivative basis,' 36 and there is no need to expand the
scope of § 8(a)(1) to embrace an agreement to arbitrate that does not implicitly
threaten loss of employment or other discipline.
3. The "Chilling Effect" Theory
Nevertheless, Marine & Shipbuilding Workers probably provides the
strongest case law support for the Board's condemnation of an arbitration
agreement that covers unfair labor practice claims as a non-derivative violation
of § 8(a)(1). 137 The Supreme Court upheld the Board's position that a union
violated § 8(b)(1)(A) when it expelled a member for filing an unfair labor
practice charge without having exhausted the union's internal remedies. 138 The
Court explained that applying the exhaustion requirement to unfair labor practice
charges contravened the policy of unimpeded access to the Board due to the
exhaustion rule's "chilling effect." 139 This chilling effect rationale is the Board's
theory for declaring a wide variety of employer rules to be unlawful. 140
The exhaustion requirement at issue in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers was
different from an arbitration agreement in two respects. First, the exhaustion
requirement was a disciplinary requirement that the union actually enforced by
expelling the member involved,' 4' but an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims
of any sort is not a disciplinary rule. To the extent that the exhaustion
requirement chilled the member, it diminished his enthusiasm for filing unfair
labor practice charges by the threat of discipline, 142 whereas an arbitration
agreement holds no threat of discipline over the employee's head. Employers
propose agreements to arbitrate statutory claims so that they have a contractual
defense to an employee who ignores the agreement and files the claim in another
forum. 43 Second, unlike an arbitration agreement, an exhaustion requirement
does not yield an impartial or final resolution of the issues.144 In the Court's
words, "[i]f the member becomes exhausted" during the process of the interested
135. See NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
136. See Chinese Daily News, 346 N.L.R.B. at 933.




140. See infra text accompanying notes 156-161.
141. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. at 421.
142. Id. at 425.
143. See Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 39 GA. L. REv. 1, 3 (2004).
144. See Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. at 425; Julie R. Vacura, Arbitration and
NLRB Deferral: From Spielberg to Suburban Motor Freight and Beyond, 20 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
785, 786 (1984) ("An arbitral award is the final resolution to a dispute.").
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party's reconsideration of its own actions, "the issues of public policy are never
reached and an airing of the grievance never had.' '145 In contrast, the arbitration
process leads directly to a resolution of the issues and an airing of the grievance,
and it typically does so far more quickly and less exhaustingly than the Board's
processes. 1 In the end, although Justice Douglas's opinion refers to the
exhaustion rule's chilling effect, the Court's holding was not that an exhaustion
rule untied to disciplinary enforcement was itself unlawful, but rather that failure
to comply with such a rule, which does not lead to an impartial resolution of the
issues, is not a defense to discipline for filing an unfair labor practice charge.147
The chilling effect theory, like public policy, is "a very unruly horse."' 48
The Board once invoked the chilling effect theory to condemn a proposal,
advanced during collective bargaining negotiations, that employees must exhaust
a grievance procedure before they could have recourse in the courts or
administrative agencies, including the Board. 4 9 The Board apparently no longer
subscribes to that position and condemns grievance-arbitration exhaustion
requirements onl1y) if they import, at least implicitly, some kind of penalty for
noncompliance. The chilling effect theory, however, semantically can fit a
rule or agreement untethered to discipline, and constitutes an imprecise
instrument that may be pressed into service to condemn a wide variety of neutral
rules or policies. 151 153
The Board in U-Haul152 relied on Martin Luther Memorial Home, Inc.,
which reaffirmed and perpetuated a series of fairly contemporary chilling effect
cases 54 that had condemned behavioral rules employees would reasonably
understand to prohibit or restrict § 7 rights.1 55 Often, ambiguous rules in such
cases chilled employee rights to make false statements when criticizing
management actions or policies, 56 to utter abusive statements when trying to
convince coworkers to sign union authorization cards, 157 to harass coworkers
145. 391 U.S. at 425.
146. See Vacura, supra note 144, at 786 (citing Julius G. Getmant, Labor Arbitration and
Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 916 (1979)) (discussing the benefits of arbitration as
compared to litigation).
147. See 391 U.S. at 428.
148. Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
149. Conoco, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 548, 555, 559 (1987).
150. See, e.g., Bills Electric, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 292, 296, 307 (2007) (describing a penalty
that required reimbursement of employer's litigation expenses if a court dismissed or stayed either
court or agency proceeding due to an arbitration agreement).
151. See 391 U.S. at 425.
152. 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
153. 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004).
154. The seminal case in the series was Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998),
enforced mem., 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
155. Martin Luther, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647; see also Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. at 829.
156. See Martin Luther, 343 N.L.R.B. at 646; Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. at 829.
157. See Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 292-94 (2000),
enforcement denied in pertinent part, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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into supporting a union without being mandatorily reported,158 to contact the
media about employment-related complaints without having to obtain prior
management approval,159 to disclose compensation to and discuss working
conditions with coworkers,16° to wear union insignia and employer-critical
messages on apparel,16 among many and various others. The rationale in such
cases was relevant in U-Haul because it was far from clear that the arbitration
agreement actually covered unfair labor practice claims.162 The chilling effect
theory is an unruly horse due to its inherent subjectivity. 63 Whereas the Board
majority in U-Haul found that employees reasonably would interpret the
arbitration agreement to cover unfair labor practice claims on the hypothesis that
they would not interpret an accompanying explanatory memo literally,164 in
other cases the Board found a chilling effect only on the hypothesis that
employees would interpret the rule according to its literal terms.1
65
More basically, the employer rules declared unlawful in these chilling effect
cases differ from a rule requiring the arbitration of statutory claims, including
unfair labor practice claims, in two respects. First, the chilling effect, which the
Board inferred,166 is predictable because the rules plainly were disciplinary
rules, 167 but an arbitration requirement is not a disciplinary rule. Second, once
the Board indulged in the literal or nonliteral hypothesis to find that the rule
covered a § 7 right,168 the restriction or abridgement of that right was
straightforward--employees simply could not exercise the § 7 right involved at
all or at least as vigorously as they wished-but an arbitration requirement does
not prevent employees from pressing with the same zeal the identical underlying
unfair labor practice claims they otherwise would bring to the Board. Indeed, in
arbitration, employees can control their own cases with their own counsel or
158. See UAW v. NLRB, 520 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2008); Battle Creek Health Sys., 341
N.L.R.B. 882, 895, 899 (2004).
159. See Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 N.L.R.B. 382, 386 (2008).
160. See Inter-Disciplinary Advantage, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 480, 503 (2007), enforced, 312 F.
App'x 737, 751 (6th Cir. 2008).
161. See Inland Cntys. Legal Servs., 317 N.L.R.B. 941, 942 (1995); Floridian Hotel of Tampa,
Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1484, 1486 (1962), enforced, 318 F.2d 545, 548-49 (1963).
162. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
163. See John Raudabaugh, Overbroad or Ambiguous Employer Rules and Policies:
Organized Labor's Toxic Tactic 3 (2009) (unpublished monograph) (on file with author). This
former Board member's study of Board decisions applying the chilling effect standard revealed split
decisions on nearly 40% of the rules at issue with the outcome dependent on the political allegiance
of the majority. Id.
164. U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 377-78.
165. See, e.g., Cintas Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 943, 946 (2005), enforced, 482 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
166. See, e.g., NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425
(1968).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 152-161.
168. See Cintas Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. at 946.
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other representatives, 169 and they will be able to press their claims even more
vigorously than the General Counsel may choose to prosecute their claims before
the Board-if the General Counsel decides to prosecute them at all.'70
The pertinence of the chilling effect theory to an arbitration agreement that
unambiguously includes unfair labor practice claims among the statutory claims
it covers is open to question, but Justice Douglas's opinion in Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers used the theory, 171 and it has become the rationale the
Board now uses routinely to condemn as independent violations of § 8(a)(1) the
mere maintenance of certain rules or policies. Consequently, it is worthwhile
to explore how an arbitration agreement is supposed to accomplish the chill.
One hypothesis is that the chilling effect of an agreement to take unfair labor
practice claims to arbitration inheres in the employees' reluctance to file charges
with the Board because they would not understand that the agreement is subject
to challenge. 173 The Board once used this theory to declare an agreement that
waived employees' right to file unfair labor practice charges unlawful and not
simply invalid. 7 Indeed, the Board asserted that employees could not learn
about grounds for challenge from the Board's agents working in its regional
offices because they are not authorized to dispense legal advice.175 Apart from
the dubiousness of that observation 176 and the absence of an arbitral forum in
that case, the Board's approach is noteworthy for its contrasts with surrounding
law and with related Board law. Agreements to arbitrate Title VII, ADA,
ADEA, FLSA, § 1981, and other statutory claims are voidable if employees
successfully challenge them on state contract law grounds, 177 but agreements to
arbitrate NLRA claims are flatly unlawful.' 78 Whereas employees are expected
169. See Getman, supra note 146, at 926.
170. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (stating that the
General Counsel has the "final authority" to prosecute claims).
171. 391 U.S. at 425.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 152-161.
173. See Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69, 72 (1988), enforced in part sub nom.
Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
174. Id. The Board ruled that a proposed no strike clause that did not allow employees to
contest discipline for violating the clause with the Board or in any other tribunal was an unlawful,
and thus a nonmandatory, bargaining subject. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The Board, albeit probably unwittingly, has abandoned this position. Indeed, it
emphasizes that the invitation on the NLRA rights notice-which employers now must post-to
contact the Board's regional offices or headquarters via hotline is meant to encourage employees to
obtain advice from the Board on issues such as statutory coverage, what conduct is prohibited,
whether they have rights in specific factual circumstances, and how to exercise their rights, among
others. See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg.
54,006, 54,021-27, 54,031 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
177. Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to compel arbitration of plaintiff's Title VI and ADA claims because the employer gave
no consideration for the agreement); see supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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to obtain advice on their own-perhaps from the EEOC or the Department of
Labor-regarding the grounds on which agreements to arbitrate all these other
statutory claims may be challenged,' 79 the NLRB makes a paternalistic
assumption that employees covered by the NLRA are incapable of or
disinterested in discovering grounds for challenge on their own.180
A more straightforward chilling effect hypothesis posits that an arbitration
agreement would induce employees to go to arbitration instead of the Board to
present their substantive statutory claims, or induce those who do not feel
strongly enough about their chances of success in arbitration, or their chances of
successfully challenging the arbitration agreement at the Board, to let their
claims expire. 181 Of course, only the subset of such employees that, despite their
lack of confidence in prevailing in arbitration, would have sufficient confidence
in prevailing at the Board to file a charge are candidates for concern and of those
employees, a chilling effect would be worth worrying about only for the fraction
whose charges the Board would find meritorious. The size of this population is
unknown and quite speculative. Whatever its size, for this group and for the
entire employee population, however, fear of discipline or other penalty is not a
motivation, and in case there is any doubt, virtually any employer would be
willing to make explicit in the arbitration agreement what already is implicit-
that the agreement to arbitrate is not a disciplinary rule, that employees have the
opportunity to mount a legal challenge to the agreement, and that anyone who
seizes that opportunity will not be disciplined or otherwise penalized for doing
so. Although the Board relies on chilling effect case law where fear of discipline
is the rationale, 82 it should be apparent that an explicit assurance of safety from
discipline would not beget a different result. This virtual certainty suggests that
the real rationale for the Board's position lies in doctrines or practical
considerations that explain a basic unwillingness to allow arbitrators to decide
unfair labor practice claims.
4. The Unlawful Condition Theory
The Board undoubtedly will contend that although an arbitration agreement
is not a disciplinary rule, it suffices to make out a violation in that it is extracted
from employees as a condition of employment. In other words, there is no
difference between making continued employment conditional on compliance
and obtaining a job conditional on entering into an agreement with which one
need not comply in order to keep the job. That contention beckons an
examination of the case law.
179. Cf. Gibson, 121 F.3d at 1131 (noting relevance of employee knowingly entering into
arbitration agreement without mentioning employee cognizance of grounds for challenge).
180. See Reichhold, 288 N.L.R.B. at 72.
181. See id.
182. See Conoco, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 548, 555, 559 (1987).
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Preliminarily, in the seminal decision underlying this argument, the Supreme
Court referred to the obvious impossibility of permitting employers to extract
agreements from their employees "not to demand performance of the duties
which [the NLRA] imposes."1 3 The term "duties" suggests that the Court was
not contemplating agreements to substitute arbitration as the forum for claims
that the employer breached duties, which the agreements leave completely
unmodified. f84
In support of the proposition that agreements extracted as a condition of
employment to waive § 7 rights are unlawful, the Board, of course, can point to
plentiful precedent involving the § 7 rights to join or support a union, to engage
in a strike, to enlist media and public support, and so forth. 85 Only a few cases
involve the § 7 right to file unfair labor practice charges, but those cases are
distinguishable. In some cases, the employees were entitled to their jobs, as in
the case of unfair labor practice strikers, as to whom any condition would have
186been unlawful. In other cases, employees would have suffered a penalty for
filing a charge with the Board, such as a forfeiture of contractual or statutory
rights, as the price for recourse to the Board. 187
Even where there is no right to the job and no continuing threat of reprisal, it
is fair to assume that a condition of employment whereby an employee waives
the right to file charges with the Board would be unlawful. In this situation and
in all the decided cases, the agreement does not simply give employees another
forum in which to press their claims. Instead, the agreement leaves the
employees with no forum at all and thus, completely helpless to vindicate their
underlying statutory rights' 88 Such agreements are the functional equivalent of
the waivers of substantive rights and duties that obviously are impermissible.
An agreement to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims provides an alternative
forum for vindicating those claims and does not exact any forfeiture of
substantive rights or relaxation of substantive duties-statutory or contractual,
actual or hoped for-as the price for vindicating those claims.
Finally, with respect to the unlawful condition theory, the unlawfulness of an
agreement that substitutes arbitration for recourse to the NLRB for claims arising
183. Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
184. id. at 364.
185. See, e.g., NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274,
279-80 (1960) (discussing such rights).
186. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356, 359, 363-364 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding as unlawful a waiver of recourse to the Board as a condition on an unfair labor practice
strikers' reinstatement); Isla Verde Hotel Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 496, 503 (1981) (same), enforced,
702 F.2d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 1983).
187. See, e.g., Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92, 95-96 (1991) (discussing waiver of the
right to arbitrate contract claims or nullification of an arbitration award for filing unfair labor
practice claims).
188. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid, 592 F.2d at 359, 363-64 (discussing an agreement that required
employees to forfeit any right to seek redress); Isla Verde Hotel, 259 N.L.R.B. at 503 (finding an
agreement required employees to waive rights of redress).
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after the agreement is entered into stands in stark contrast to the NLRB's
treatment of agreements not to file unfair labor practice charges in exchange for
employment or reinstatement when the claim arises before the agreement is
entered into. That is, it is quite lawful for an employer to obtain a complete
release, including the withdrawal of an already filed unfair labor practice charge
which is being investigated, in a settlement of a contestable discharge or
discipline even if the employer proposes, and the agreement provides for,
reinstatement only in exchange for the release.' 89 It also is lawful for employers
and employees to agree in advance that the employees will be entitled to a
benefit, such as a special severance payment or presumably reinstatement, only if
they sign a release after a termination that may generate a potential claim.1
9 °
There is nothing wrong with conditioning employment on a waiver of recourse
to the Board in this setting, even though the waiver is not coupled with an
alternative forum.' 91 The only difference is that the employee makes this waiver
after the employer's challengeable action already has occurred, whereas an
arbitration agreement covers challengeable actions that may or may not occur in
the future, 12  Although the Board historically has adopted paternalistic
assumptions about employee intelligence and vulnerability, 19 nothing in the
statute requires these assumptions, much less the "more-nice-than-obvious"
distinction between intellectual capacity to assess whether an absolute post facto
waiver is worthwhile but not a pre facto forum waiver. After all, that distinction
does not justify condemning forum waivers under Title VII or other employment
statutes.
The instruction is twofold: (1) there is nothing inherently wrong with
conditioning employment on a waiver of recourse to the Board, and (2) finding
the arbitration agreement, but not the settlement, unlawful has another
explanation rooted in policy choices, not wooden dogmas.
189. See, e.g., Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the Board
did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reach the merits of an unfair labor practice claim due
to a settlement that reinstated sympathy strikers without back pay in exchange for release of all
claims); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 243 N.L.R.B. 501, 503 (1979) (holding that it was not
unlawful to include in a settlement of disputed suspension, an agreement to withdraw pending
unfair labor practice charges and not to file any future charges over suspension).
190. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 732, 732-33 (1991).
191. See id.
192. See generally Bodie, supra note 143, at 18 ("Predispute employment arbitration
agreements, however, are signed at the beginning of employment, well before any disputes arise.").
193. See, e.g., Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69, 72 (1988), enforced in part sub nom.
Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
194. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668, 672-73 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding arbitration agreement unenforceable if its provisions do not permit adequate vindication of
statutory rights but effective to waive judicial forum for pursuing prospective statutory claims if
knowingly and voluntarily executed).
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F. The Alternative Analytical Framework
The Board's chilling effect and unlawful condition theories rely on the
premises that the opportunity to file charges with the Board is a § 7 right and that
this right is indistinguishable from other § 7 rights, but that framework is not the
only analytical path. Nor is it the way in which agreements to arbitrate claims
under virtually all other statutes are analyzed. 195 Once again, in Gilmer as in its
FAA predecessors and its progeny, the Supreme Court selected a quite different
analytical framework for agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. 196 These
agreements do not relinquish substantive statutory rights but simply waive the
usual forum in which an employee attempts to establish a violation of those
rights. 197 Moreover, because all that is being waived is a forum, not substantive
rights, an employer's conditioning employment on a forum waiver agreement is
not unenforceable simply because the employer has considerable bargaining
leverage over an applicant for employment, or incumbent employee, and the
bargain seems to be a contract of adhesion.198 Rather, as explained in Part I.D,
under the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims is unenforceable-not
unlawful-only if generally applicable state contract law would make any
contract unenforceable for the same reasons or if remedial or other restrictions in
the agreement make that particular arbitration procedure ineffective for
vindicating the statutory rights. 1
The Board could have adopted Gilmer's analytical framework. It was not
required either to perpetuate the notion that itself as forum is a § 7 right
indistinguishable from substantive § 7 rights when another forum is afforded, or
to extend doctrines developed for disciplinary rules and policies or employment
conditions that abrogate substantive § 7 rights or remove any forum to vindicate
200them. As explained above, in order to preserve statutory symmetry, it makes
sense to find that § 7 embraces the right to file an unfair labor practice charge,
but the structure of the Act does not require any more than protecting the right to
file a charge against reprisal or against removal without an adequate arbitral
substitute. Although the broad language of § 8(a)(1) literally encompasses any
195. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 43-45, and 51-52.
196. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-28 (1991).
197. Id.; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial
forum."); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)
(explaining that arbitration agreements "like the provision for concurrent jurisdiction [within the
Securities Act], serve to advance the objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the
forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise").
198. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33; Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 184 (3d. Cir.
1998).
199. See discussion supra Part I.D.
200. See discussion supra Part I.E.
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restriction that may be deemed interference, 2° 1 that language obviously cannot be
and has not been interpreted literally.
In defense of the Board's position, it may be argued that the forum versus
substantive rights distinction the Supreme Court drew in Gilmer and other FAA
decisions2°2 is viable only when the substantive right is the right not to be
victimized by an employer's discriminatory practices or conduct (as in Title VII,
the ADEA, or the ADA),203 but not in the case of § 7 where all rights are
variations of the employees' right to engage in self help. 2°4 The argument
essentially posits that it is impossible to separate forum from substance when
filing a charge with the Board is simply one form of self help among other
forms, such as strikes, recourse to a union or the media, or circulation of protest
petitions, which are indisputably substantive § 7 rights.
205
That argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it overlooks the right
of self help that Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, the FMLA, and other statutes
confer. Sections 704(a) of Title VII, 4(d) of the ADEA, 503(a) of the ADA, and
105(a)(2) of the FMLA all protect employees who have either participated in
formal enforcement proceedings or otherwise "opposed" discriminatory
employment practices, yet the distinction between either form of self help and
the choice of forum is still easily drawn. 207  Second, the Board's deferral to
201. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
202. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
203. See supra notes 30 and 51 and accompanying text.
204. See NLRA § (7), 29 U.S.C. § 157.
205. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 394 (1983) (The NLRA "makes
unlawful the discharge of a worker because of union activity." (citations omitted)); Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) ("[E]mployees [do not] lose their protection under the 'mutual aid
or protection' clause [of § 7] when they seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or
otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employer-
employee relationship."); NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962) (unannounced
strike by unrepresented employees without specific, antecedent demand is protected by § 7);
FiveCAP, Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002) (circulation of petition seeking
amelioration of working conditions is protected by § 7); Pilot Dev. Sw., 317 N.L.R.B. 962, 966
(1995) (communication to newspaper reporter about disputed working conditions is protected by § 7
(citations omitted)).
206. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(2006); Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006).
207. Thus, enforcement of arbitration agreements as to both kinds of retaliation claims under
federal statutes and state statutes modeled on Title VII is routine. See, e.g., Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav.
Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[Employee's] claim of retaliatory discharge, pursuant
to 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, was within the scope of the broad arbitration clause in [employee's]
employment agreement."); McQueen-Starling v. United Health Grp., Inc., 08 Civ. 4885(JGK), 2011
WL 104092, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2011) (upholding an arbitration award in favor of employers
in a claim of retaliation and discrimination under New York State's Human Rights Law and New
York City's Human Right's Law); Briede v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., No. 10-649-HA, 2010 WL
4236929, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2010) (holding that an employee's post-employment retaliation
27
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collective bargaining agreements' arbitration process confirms that it is quite
possible to distinguish between recourse to the Board as forum and other § 7
rights."'
G. Balancing
The Board's unarticulated assumption about the equivalency and purpose
insensitivity of § 7 rights does not compel its conclusion that agreements to
arbitrate unfair labor practice claims violate § 8(a)(1). 209 A § 8(a)(1) violation at
least depends on a proverbial-and at the margin a very subjective-"balancing"
test.21° In some contexts, the employer's justification simply prevails unless its.... 211
motive is impermissible, but a balancing test otherwise is required. According
to this test, the extent of the restriction on the particular § 7 right involved and
the employer's justification for the rule or policy are weighed in the balance.
2 12
The Board in U-Haul did not engage in that balancing, apparently believing that
any justification the employer could offer would be outweighed by the impact on, .... 213
an employees' § 7 right to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board. A
careful examination of the particular right involved, the impact on employees,
and the employer's justification makes this a closer question.
With respect to the particular § 7 right involved, once again characterizing
recourse to the Board as a substantive right invites the bestowal of more weight
than it deserves as a forum choice. A balance that does not bias the outcome by
means of an a priori characterization focuses more on the extent of the restriction
claim was subject to arbitration pursuant to a state statute that is "patterned after Title VII, which
prohibits employment-related discrimination" (citing A.L.P. Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 984
P.2d 883, 885 (Or. Ct. App. 1999))); Nunez v. Citibank, N.A., No. 08 CV. 5398 (BSJ), 2009 WL
256107, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2009) (holding that all claims involved in an action by an employee
alleging that an employer discriminated and retaliated against the employee in violation of city,
state, and federal law were arbitrable); Fisher v. Sutton Place/Pinnacle A.M.S., No. 1:07-CV-1537-
DFH-WTL, 2008 WL 2095417 (S.D. Ind. May 16, 2008) (holding that claims of race discrimination
and retaliation under Title VII must be arbitrated).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53, 76-86, 121-121124, 186-193, and Part I.E.3.
209. See supra Part I.E.
210. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945) (citing Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492,
495 (1978) (discussing the Board's balancing process).
211. See Bus. Servs. by Manpower, Inc. v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 442, 451 (2d Cir. 1986), denying
enforcement to, 272 N.L.R.B. 827 (1984); Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712, 722
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)); NLRB v.
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.8 (3d Cir. 1970) (citing NLRB v. Burnup &
Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22 (1964); NLRB v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d 1306, 1308, 1309 (1st
Cir. 1969)); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 638, 642 (1982).
212. Int'l Bus. Machs., 265 N.L.R.B. at 642 (citing Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916,
918-19 (3d Cir. 1976)).
213. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
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that an arbitration agreement places on employees' opportunity to obtain
remedial vindication of their rights under the NLRA.
That restriction should not be overestimated. Preliminarily, an employee
who has agreed to arbitrate statutory claims would not completely lose the
opportunity to have those NLRA or other statutory claims adjudicated by the
214Board or a court. As noted above, under § 2 of the FAA, an arbitration
agreement does not foreclose litigation if it is unenforceable under generally
applicable state contract law principles. 2 15 Although virtually all states' contract
law principles make unenforceable contracts that are, among other grounds,
procedurally and substantively unconscionable,2 16 the standards for determining
what constitutes unconscionability vary, especially when outlier states are
included in the comparison. 217 The Board, of course, is not interested in using
state law standards, but if it were to look at the standards of the states, such as
California, which has broadest opportunity to escape an arbitration agreement
due to unconscionability, 218 relatively few arbitration agreements would pass
muster.
As also noted above, if restrictions in a particular arbitration agreement
deprive employees of an opportunity effectively to vindicate their statutory
rights, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable.2 9 The Board would be free to
adopt its own standards for the enforceability of arbitration agreements, just as it
adopted standards for deferral to collectively bargained arbitration agreements.2
In the end, arbitration agreements need not always foreclose employees from
having the Board adjudicate their unfair labor practice claims; and when
employees are foreclosed, they still do not lose the opportunity for vindication of
221
their NLRA rights because they can present the claims in arbitration.
214. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 82 and 88.
216. See supra cases cited in notes 88-91.
217. Compare, e.g., Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072, 1075, 1084 (9th Cir.
2007) (finding a Dispute Resolution Program to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable
under California law), with Caley, 428 F.3d at 1377-79 (rejecting claim by employees that dispute
resolution policy was unconscionable), and Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294,
301 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable using
Texas law while acknowledging a similar agreement would be unconscionable under California law
(citing Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 788 (9th Cir. 2002))).
218. See, e.g., Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009) (California
statute makes class grievance ban in certain arbitration agreements unconscionable), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (FAA
preempts statute); Davis, 485 F.3d at 1084.
219. See Davis, 485 F.3d at 1082 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
28 (1991); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 680-81 (Cal. 2000)).
220. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987) (noting the
SEC's broad authority to mandate "the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that
arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights"); United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557,
559-60 (1984).
221. See United Techs., 268 N.L.R.B. at 559-60.
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From the employee's perspective, the real difference between the pursuit of
an unfair labor practice claim at the Board and the pursuit of that claim in
arbitration is that the former is undertaken at taxpayer expense, whereas, the
latter may involve paying some of the arbitration costs and footing the bill for an
attorney or going without legal representation. 2 Under the FAA, if a party to
an arbitration agreement covering statutory claims seeks to invalidate the
agreement on the ground that the arbitration costs are prohibitive, that party
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of having to absorb such costs, and
the agreement's silence does not satisfy that burden.223 This principle leaves a
number of questions unresolved, including whether it applies to provisions for
the splitting or shifting of attorneys' fees when the statute at issue, like Title VII,
the ADA, or the ADEA, provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees by
successful plaintiffs; 224 and whether a court should make that determination as a
threshold question of enforceability or an arbitrator ought to resolve the apparent
conflict between the agreement's attorneys' fee provision and its coverage of
claims under such statutes. 12 The NLRA differs from statutes like Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA in that it does not provide for the award of attorneys' fees
to the successful employee, but instead eliminates the need to spend money on
attorneys' fees for those employees whose charges the General Counsel decides
226to prosecute. In other words, unlike under more contemporary employment
statutes, taxpayers fund the prosecution of such charges. The issue becomes the
impact of the costs that an employee must or may have to pay in order to bring
227an unfair labor practice claim to arbitration.
When the Board defers to the arbitration process under a collective
228bargaining agreement, the individual grievant usually is represented by the
union. Therefore, the grievant does not bear the cost alone, but shares it with
fellow colleagues who pay dues and even then, ordinarily not beyond the regular
222. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) ("It may well
be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.").
223. Id. at 91-92.
224. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006);
Title VH of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(K) (2006); Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006).
225. See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90) (stating that an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable merely
because it involves "fee-shifting," when it does not deny statutory fights under Title VII); Blair v.
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90) (same).
Compare Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88, 91-92 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
an arbitrator must first decide attorneys' fees issue), with Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279
F.3d 889, 894 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the mere presence of an arbitration cost shifting
provision invalidated the agreement).
226. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006).
227. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
228. United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984).
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amount of dues. 229 Does the Board declare individual agreements to arbitrate
unfair labor practice claims unlawful because it is unwilling to let the cost of
arbitration stand in the way of vindicating claims under a statute that, unlike
more contemporary employment statutes, features taxpayer funded prosecution
of alleged wrongdoers?
Although a seemingly plausible rationale, the cost difference is not the
Board's reason for outlawing agreements to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims.
Preliminarily, in recent years unions, which generally can afford counsel, have
filed between 53% and 58%, and individuals only between 36% and 43%, of the
charges the Board received annually. 23° The Board does not stay its hand in
deference to arbitration when charges are filed by a union rather than an
individual employee who is a party to an arbitration ageement, or even inquire
whether a union is financing the costs of arbitration. When the arbitration
agreement is collectively bargained, the Board's deferral criteria do not include
whether the union wants to spend its limited funds on the arbitral process.
232
More importantly, an arbitration agreement that does not mention attorneys'
233fees but covers claims under various statutes, including the NLRA, probably
would not preclude an arbitrator from awarding fees on a complete remediation
theory to an employee who successfully pursues an unfair labor practice claim.
Just as the arbitrator can award fees on that theory to employees who
successfully pursue claims under statutes authorizing the recovery of such
234fees, the arbitrator would not seem to be barred from awarding fees to the
successful unfair labor practice grievant, who would not have paid for an
attorney if the General Counsel had prosecuted his claim before the Board.
If the arbitration agreement explicitly, or implicitly, provided for the award
of attorneys' fees to the extent a grievant is successful in prosecuting a statutory
claim, the only chilling effect that coverage of unfair labor practice claims would
produce is limited to two sets of employees: (1) those who do not have good
claims, but want a free ride at the taxpayers' expense anyway, and (2) those who
have good claims, but lack confidence in their ability to succeed in arbitration,
229. Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual
Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Reconciliation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 753
(1997).
230. See 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 91 tbl.1 (2009); 73 NLRB ANN. REP. 77 tbl.1 (2008); 72 NLRB
ANN. REP. 119 tbl.1 (2007); 71 NLRB ANN. REP. app. at 117 tbl.1 (2006); 70 NLRB ANN. REP.
app. at 104 tbl.1 (2005).
231. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528
(D.C. Cir. 2007). Compare NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 827, 841 (1984)
(noting individual had right to act alone in filing a charge with the Board absent union support),
with United Techs., 268 N.L.R.B. at 557, 559-60 (holding that where a union filed a grievance for
an employee, the claim was best suited for arbitration as agreed in collective bargaining).
232. See United Techs., 268 N.L.R.B. at 559-60.
233. See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83 n.1 (2000)
(noting that attorneys' fees not mentioned in arbitration agreement).
234. See Powell v. Carey Int'l, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (stating
arbitrator can award attorneys fees under FLSA).
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while having enough confidence to file a charge with the Board. The first set
deserves no concern. With regard to the second set, because only about 35% of
the unfair labor practice charges have sufficient merit for the General Counsel to
prosecute (and the merit percentage is probably lower for charges filed by
individuals rather than unions or employers), 235 the psychological disincentive
due to loss of the free ride is worth worrying about only in relation to that
portion of the 35% for whom the recovery of attorneys' fees would be
insufficient to overcome their fear of losing in arbitration despite their belief that
they have a good claim, but for whom the General Counsel would be successful.
Even that group has to be reduced by the number of employees who are willing
to go to arbitration if they can find an attorney to pursue their claim on a
contingent fee basis. It is doubtful that solicitude for the hypothetical and
probably small remaining subset of employees tips the balance in favor of
condemning all agreements to arbitrate.
Lest the cost difference still seems critical to the Board's condemnation of
agreements to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims, two considerations militate
against this hypothesis. First, the 65% of persons who file non-meritorious
charges with the Board236 get no therapeutic value out of the process because
they do not get their day in court, but everyone who files a charge in the form of
237
a grievance gets his or her day in court, so to speak. An employee need not
hire an attorney to obtain the therapeutic value of being able to confront and
cross-examine the employer at a hearing and obtain an impartial arbitrator's
decision on the merits. The taxpayer funded NLRB process does not offer that
therapy to claimants in the 65% majority,138 and that difference may offset, to a
degree, the cost differential. Second, and more poignantly, if an employer were
to agree that the arbitration process is completely cost free to employees who use
it with their own counsel, that would eliminate the cost difference as the possible
rationale for the Board's position. Yet, the Board still would brand the
239agreement unlawful. In sum, the Board's dogmatic position does not rely on a
cost rationale, and its adherence to that position when there is no cost difference
bespeaks a different rationale.
With respect to the employer's justifications, what is not at issue is an
arbitration agreement that covers only unfair labor practice claims. Such
discrimination against unfair labor practice claims could not reasonably be
justified. As the Board construed it, however, the arbitration agreement at issue
235. Memorandum GC 11-03 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Emps.,
Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2010) 4 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at https:/lwww.nlrb.gov/
publications/general-counsel-memos (stating that the preliminary figure for fiscal year 2010 is
35.6%, consistent with fluctuation between 32% and 40% since 1980).
236. Id. at 3.
237. See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757, 765 (1977), enforced in relevant part, 587
F.2d 403,413 (9th Cir. 1978).
238. Solomon, supra note 235, at 3.
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in U-Haul, like any arbitration agreement an employer is likely to propose,
covered virtually all statutory, employment-related claims. 240 The employer's
reasons for such an agreement are litigation related. Arbitration almost alway4s
reduces the potentially enormous time and commensurate costs of litigation.
The savings are not limited to attorneys' fees. The litigation process consumes
more of the time managers and support personnel must spend away from their
primary responsibilities on discovery, witness preparation, and testimony than
arbitration does.
242
Litigation before the NLRB often is nearly as expensive in terms of
attorneys' time and fees and management distraction as litigation in court.
243
Like the pretrial and trial phases in federal district court, Board litigation
includes prehearing document production during the investigatory stage, albeit
only to and not from the NLRB General Counsel. 244  Board litigation also
includes not infrequent prehearing motion practice, witness preparation, and an
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge, followed by the filing of
245exceptions and posthearing briefs. Considerable time is saved in Board
litigation by the absence of depositions and the replacement of full prehearing
discovery with trial subpoenas, but that savings is offset by the addition of an
extra layer of posthearing appeal in Board litigation. Whereas an employer who
loses in federal district court has one appeal to a United States Court of
Appeals, 246 an employer who loses before an administrative law judge has two
appeals: one to the Board and one to a United States Court of Appeals. 247 The
first involves filing with the Board exceptions to the administrative law judge's
decision and supporting briefs, as well as responses to the General Counsel's and
the charging party's exceptions. 248 The second involves the preparation of an
appeal to a United States Court of Appeals if the Board's decision is adverse.
249
An employer who loses a case in federal district court can cut off additional
litigation expense by complying with the adverse judgment, typically by
reinstating or promoting the plaintiff and paying the damages, but that is not true
240. Id.
241. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
242. See Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1991)).
243. See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing
Workplace Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1025, 1049 (2010) (discussing costs associated with federal and
state workplace laws and their enforcement schemes).
244. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (2006); NLRB v.
Carolina Food Processors, Inc., 81 F.3d 507, 511-513 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding Board's policy of
permitting only pre-hearing discovery by the General Counsel against due process challenge);
Offshore Mariners United, 338 N.L.R.B. 745, 746-47 (2002) (Board adheres to that policy).
245. See National Labor Relations Board, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.24-46 (2011).
246. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a).
247. See NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
248. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.46.
249. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
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for an employer who loses before the Board, who still may face enforcement
250litigation on the appellate level °. In sum, the employer's time and resource
conservation reasons for preferring arbitration are just as valid in the context of
NLRA claims as they are in the case of claims under any other employment
statute.
No genuine balancing would fail to take account of the advantages
employees may obtain in the arbitral process. Every employee, not just the small
minority whose cases the General Counsel decides to prosecute, obtains a
hearing on the merits. Moreover, arbitrators typically issue awards earlier than
administrative law judges decide cases and virtually always far earlier than a
252 253Board decision, which is not self-enforcing. Finally, the arbitral process is
254less formal than Board proceedings, and that informality may increase the
employees' comfort level with the adversarial process.
When arbitration agreements cover unfair labor practice claims, the Board
255has eschewed the balancing process . The rejection of balancing, which is the
traditional analysis for other § 8(a)(1) violations except where the employer acts
from a hostile motive, is instructive. The employer's reasons for preferring to
arbitrate statutory claims are not any less legitimate or substantial when the
claims are NLRA claims than when they invoke other employment statutes
such as Title VII, ADEA, or ADA. Rather, the Board's underlying reason for
believing that balancing is unnecessary seems to have more to do with what is at
stake in terms of the Board's mission and function and with its perception that
the employer's interests are patently insufficient in relation thereto. Z56 As it
turns out, the Board may be correct that balancing is unwarranted, but not
because of the insufficiency of the employer's interests.
250. Reinstatement or promotion of, and payment of lost compensation to, an unfair labor
practice victim does not constitute full compliance with a Board's remedial order because the cease
and desist portion of the order typically also includes a ban on any like or related conduct that
operates prospectively, so that the General Counsel can seek judicial enforcement of the Board's
order. See NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 567 (1950); Mitchellance, Inc. v. NLRB,
90 F.3d 1150, 1159 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 890
(7th Cir. 1990)).
251. See supra text accompanying note 235.
252. Amy L. Ray, When Employers Litigate to Arbitrate: New Standards of Enforcement for
Employer Mandated Arbitration Agreements, 51 SMU L. REv. 441, 442 (1998) ("Arbitration is
generally quicker and less expensive than traditional litigation ... .
253. NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
254. See Laura J. Cooper, Discovery in Labor Arbitration, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1281, 1324
(1998) ("Over many years the practice of labor arbitration has evolved into a system that is
reasonably inexpensive, informal, and efficient.").
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H. The Case for No Balancing
An employer's agreement with employees to use the arbitral process for
resolving their statutory claims represents a choice of forum.257 The question is
whether that choice of forum is subject to the balancing process at all. The
employer's choice of forum seems to be the equivalent of a plaintiffs choice of
whether to file suit in federal or state court258 or to file instead a nominally
different but related claim with an administrative agency. Although a plaintiff s
freedom depends in part on the facts, it also depends on choices such as which
claims to assert, how to frame the allegations in the complaint, whether to
exhaust internal or administrative avenues of relief, whom to recruit as co-
plaintiffs, and how much in damages to seek, among others. These choices are
afforded by the legislatively prescribed jurisdictional, venue, and procedural
rules that regulate forum choice, and they are an essential part of how a plaintiff
decides to pursue, most advantageously, claims against an employer. 9 As such,
these choices are the plaintiff s alone to make, a proposition that the law captures
in the federal jurisdiction principle that the plaintiff is the master of his or her
own complaint.
260
The employer's preference for arbitration also is a choice afforded by the
legislatively prescribed rules regarding available fora. 26t Unlike a plaintiff's
choices, the employer' s choice of arbitration as forum has significance only if an
employee agrees. 262 Even then, the arbitration agreement must be capable of
surviving a challenge under state or federal law.263 Moreover, if the employee
agrees and the agreement meets state contract law and federal effective
264vindication thresholds, that agreement also binds the employer to arbitrate.
Like a plaintiff's choice to forego a federal claim in order to litigate in state
court, an employer's arbitration covenant is hardly inconsequential. The
employer may have to defend both a much larger number of claims than
employees would litigate, a possibility that mitigates the cost advantage, and
face a more limited chance of overturning an adverse decision.
266
257. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
258. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299
U.S. 109, 113 (1936) (citing Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313, 334 (1906); Fair v. Kohler Die
& Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 23 (1913)).
259. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 346-49 (2006) (discussing
the ways in which plaintiffs can play "forum games").
260. See Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; Gully, 299 U.S. at 113 (citing Devine, 202 U.S. at
334; Fair, 228 U.S. at 23).
261. Bassett, supra note 259, at 346-49.
262. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
263. See id.
264. See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); supra Part I.D.
265. See, e.g., Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
266. See 9 U.S.C. § 10. Section 10 of the FAA provides very limited grounds upon which an
arbitration award may be vacated: procurement of the award by corruption, fraud or undue means,
the arbitrator's partiality or corruption, the arbitrator's misconduct in refusing to postpone a hearing
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Under the FAA, when an employer's choice of arbitration instead of
litigation is embodied in an agreement, it prevails so long as the arbitration
agreement is enforceable under generally applicable state contract law principles
and if it covers statutory claims, so long as it does not contain restrictions that
267would prevent effective vindication of those claims. Congress already has
done the balancing. The employer's choice to arbitrate is afforded by the FAA,
which is a part of the surrounding legal framework. Why, then, should the
arbitration agreement not be dispositive and immune from balancing?
The substantive and procedural defenses an employer may decide to raise in
unfair labor practice litigation are certainly not subject to any balancing test,
even though they may defeat the General Counsel's claim and thereby leave an
employee who has been discharged after, or even for, engaging in a § 7 activity
remediless.268 No one would claim, for example, that an employer's choice to
assert a § 10(b) limitations period bar or object to critical evidence on hearsay or
other grounds should be balanced against the impact of that defense on the
discharged employee's § 7 rights or his coworkers' inclination to exercise those
rights. It seems that forum choice, which does not have the same effect on
outcome, should stand on the same footing.
The Board, of course, is less interested in giving the employer's forum
choice dispositive effect than it is in weighing that choice in a balance. So long
as the agreement can survive challenge, 269 the FAA may require acceding to the
employer's arbitral forum choice when other statutory claims are at issue, but not
270when it comes to the Board's role in deciding unfair labor practice claims.
for good cause or refusing to hear pertinent and material evidence or other prejudicial misbehavior,
and the arbitrator's exceeding his or her powers or so imperfectly executing them as to fail to render
a final, mutual and definite award. Id. These grounds, and those listed in § 11, are exclusive and
may not be expanded by the parties. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 592
(2008) (stating that the "FAA confines its expedited judicial review to the grounds listed in 9 U.S.C.
§§ 10 and 11"). For example, in the case of statutory claims, the parties cannot effectively agree to
vacate an arbitration award under the FAA if the arbitrator decides a statutory issue incorrectly. See
id. at 592. But cf Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 97 (Tex. 2011) (construing similar
language in state counterpart to the FAA differently).
267. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; supra Part I.D.
268. The Board has claimed the authority to sanction the assertion of a frivolous defense to
sufficiently egregious unfair labor practices, Alwin Mfg. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 646, 648 (1998),
enforcement granted on other grounds, 192 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but it has never found
that advancing a frivolous defense is an unfair labor practice in and of itself, and even the Board's
authority to award attorneys' fees as a sanction is questionable. Compare Unbelievable, Inc., 318
N.L.R.B. 857, 861-62 (1995), enforcement denied in pertinent part, 118 F.3d 795, 806 (D.C. Cir.
1997), with Alwin Mfg., 326 N.L.R.B. at 647 & n.6.
269. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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L Collectively Bargained Agreements to Arbitrate Unfair Labor Practice
Claims
Perhaps most indicative of the real rationale behind the Board's
condemnation of employer-employee arbitration agreements that cover unfair
labor practice claims is how the Board would treat collective bargaining
agreements that do the same thing. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,271 the
Supreme Court rejected the bulk of the reasoning in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 272 where it had opined that collectively bargained arbitration
273
machinery was inapposite for statutory discrimination claims. With the
benefit of a quarter century of precedent, during which it radically changed its
view regarding the arbitration of statutory claims, the Court ruled that a union's
collectively bargained agreement to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims is
274enforceable under the FAA. Assimilating such union agreements to the
individual employees' agreements to arbitrate statutory claims it had enforced in
Gilmer, the Court declared that "[n]othing in the law suggests a distinction
between the status of arbitration agreements si7ned by an individual employee
and those agreed to by a union 
representative."
That declaration would call into question the quite different treatment the
Board gives to collectively bargained and individual agreements to arbitrate. On
the one hand, the Board is willing to defer processing unfair labor practice.... .276
claims to collectively bargained arbitration agreements. On the other, it
brands individual agreements to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims as per se
277
unlawful. The easy explanation for the difference focuses on the union's
collective strength and status as exclusive bargaining representative and its
27ability to waive § 7 rights of the employees it represents.   However, that
explanation goes further than the Board is prepared to go in allowing itself to be
replaced as forum.
Preliminarily, it should not escape the need for an explanation to simply
observe that "the law" to which the Supreme Court referred was the FAA not the
271. 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1468-69 (2009).
272. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
273. See id. at 59-60.
274. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1469, 1474. The premise of 14 Penn Plaza is that the
collective bargaining agreement clearly must authorize the arbitrator to decide the statutory claim.
Id. at 1469. See Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, 649 F.3d 1199, 1206-08 (10th Cir.
2011) (defining the ban on discrimination in an arbitration agreement by reference to federal law
was insufficient to waive the right to a judicial forum where the agreement limited the arbitrator's
power to decide only the grievance submitted and where grievance did not refer to Title VII claims).
275. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.
276. See United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984).
277. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377-78 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527,
528 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
278, See generally 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1464 ("As in any contractual negotiation, a
union may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in
return for other concession from the employer.").
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NLRA. 279 The FAA is not as foreign to the NLRA as the observation assumes,
for the FAA provides the same pro-arbitration impetus 28° that the common law
developed under § 301281 has given to the Board's deference to collectively
282bargained arbitration agreements under the NLRA. It always has been an
enigma why the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama2 83 neglected to base its enforcement of arbitration covenants in
collective bargaining agreements on the FAA, and instead inventively interpreted
the jurisdictional language in § 301 to authorize the creation of pro-arbitration
common law.284 Although not the issue in 14 Penn Plaza, the Supreme Court's
decision in that case should put to rest any doubt that the FAA applies to the
enforcement of arbitration covenants in collective bargaining agreements
generally. Since the FAA is an alternative basis for enforcing collectively
bargained arbitration agreements and the FAA draws no distinction between
285individual and collectively bargained agreements to arbitrate statutory issues,
the distinction between the NLRA and the FAA does not begin to explain the
Board's deferral to arbitration of statutory NLRA issues in the context of
collective bargaining agreements but not in the case of individual agreements.
279. Id. at 1465.
280. See supra Part I.D.
281. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
283. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
284. Id. at 451-52. Dissenting in Lincoln Mills, 453 U.S. at 466-67, Justice Frankfurter
chided the majority for failing to mention the FAA, but he assumed the FAA would not apply to
collective bargaining agreements due to the FAA's coverage exclusion for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. He noted, however, that the First Circuit took the position that
the FAA does apply to collective bargaining agreements. 353 U.S. at 467-68 (quoting Local 205,
United Elec. Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 96-98 (1st Cir. 1956)); accord Local 251 v.
Narragansett Improvement Co., 503 F.2d 309, 311 (1st Cir. 1974). Although the Supreme Court did
not decide that the FAA's coverage exclusion applied only to employment contracts of
transportation workers until 2001, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 102, 120-21 (2001),
it had taken the position long before Lincoln Mills that collective bargaining agreements are not
employment contracts but essentially trade agreements. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-
35 (1944). For that reason, the FAA's coverage exclusion should not have applied when Lincoln
Mills was decided. Nevertheless, thirty years after Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court assumed that
the coverage exclusion applies to collective bargaining agreements so that the FAA had only a
"guidance" function. See United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 n.9 (1987) (citing 9
U.S.C. § 1; Lincoln Mills, 453 U.S. at 450-51). It noted the coverage issue, but left it unresolved in
relation to transportation workers twelve years later. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S.
70, 77 n.1 (1998). The application of the FAA to enforce arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements, however, does not furnish a basis for federal court jurisdiction, which § 301
clearly does. See Lincoln Mills, 453 U.S. at 451-52. With respect to enforcement of arbitration
awards, the applicability of the FAA generates other issues, such as whether the three month time
limit in FAA § 12 for motions to vacate or modify such awards is applicable when the jurisdictional
basis is § 301. See, e.g., United Steel Workers v. Wise Alloys, L.L.C., 642 F.3d 1344, 1353 (1 1th
Cir. 2011) ("Section 301 is silent on the time for filing a motion to vacate.").
285. See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009).
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Finally, although 14 Penn Plaza involved the FAA, the Supreme Court almost
certainly would enforce a collectively bargained agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims under the § 301 common law so long as the arbitrator's authority to
resolve the statutory issue is sufficiently clear.2I
Ironically, however, the Board probably will accept, albeit to reach a
contrary result, the Court's declaration in 14 Penn Plaza about the law drawing
no distinction between individual and collectively bargained arbitration
agreements. 287 Although the Board defers to collectively bargained arbitration
mechanisms even when individual employees file unfair labor practice claims,
288
deferral occurs when the unfair labor practice issue is either coincident with, or
dependent upon resolution of, the contract issue.2 89 In the former category are
cases where the contract issue-whether there is good cause for discharge or
discipline-is essentially coincident with the unfair labor practice issue-
typically whether the penalty was meted out for some § 7 activity, such as union
stewardship, pursuit of a grievance, or protest of a work directive or condition of
employment. 9° In the latter category fall cases where the unfair labor practice
issue of whether management acted in derogation of its bargaining duty depends
on whether the agreement has authorized management to take, or the union has.. 291
waived its bargaining rights over, such actions. In these circumstances,
deference to the grievance machinery, which union and employer have
committed to use for resolving their disputes during the contract term, serves two
purposes. First, it recognizes that arbitration is the forum through which the
union and employer carry out their bargaining function as it relates to midterm
contract disputes and thereby furthers the avowed congressional preference for
286. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 79-80.
287. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1456.
288. See, e.g., United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984) ("It is fundamental to the
concept of collective bargaining that the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement are bound by
the terms of their contract.").
289. See, e.g., San Juan Bautista Med. Ctr., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 102, slip op. at 2 (Feb. 28,
2011) ("A dispute is well suited to arbitration when the meaning of a contract provision is at the
heart of the dispute.").
290. See, e.g., NLRB v. Roswil, Inc., 55 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995) (Board abused its discretion
by failing to defer to arbitral process under United Technologies, where employee alleged discharge
and disciplinary threat for complaining about new manager's favoritism). That statutory and
contract issues are coincident or " factually parallel," to use the even more expansive language the
Board uses in relation to deferral to awards, Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984), is
insufficient to require employees to arbitrate other statutory issues-even if the arbitrator would
normally apply statutory principles in determining the meaning of the contract. The waiver of a
judicial forum must be clear and unmistakable, and unless the agreement clearly authorizes the
arbitrator to decide the statutory compliance issue, that waiver will not be found. See Wright, 525
U.S. at 80-82. From this perspective, the Board will find collectively bargained waivers of recourse
to itself as forum more easily than a court would find a waiver of recourse to a judicial forum to
enforce other statutory rights.
291. See, e.g., Caritas Good Samaritan Med. Ctr., 340 N.L.R.B. 61, 61-63 (2003) (deferring to
arbitration the question of whether the employer could unilaterally change the employees' health
insurance contributions without first bargaining with the union).
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resolving such disputes through the arbitration process. 292 Second, it preserves
the integrity of the arbitral institution by not permitting the union, or the
employees it represents, to evade the commitment to arbitrate contractual claims
by simply styling them as unfair fair labor practice charges.
Consider, however, a collective bargaining agreement that clearly requires
the arbitration of all statutory claims, including unfair labor practice claims.
Although the agreement is enforceable under the FAA, the Board almost
certainly will have a different view under the NLRA. In this circumstance, the
agreement to arbitrate all unfair labor practice claims would go well beyond the
arbitration agreements to which the Board historically has deferred because it
would sweep in more unfair labor practice claims than those that are coincident
with, or dependent upon, the contract claims. It would require the arbitration of
claims, for example, that the employer violated § 8(a)(1) by questioning
employees about who instigated circulation of a protest petition, or which
employees are planning to file an FLSA suit for overtime pay, or by• . 293
promulgating a rule barring unauthorized contact with the media. Deference
here would serve neither the purpose of furthering the collective bargaining
process nor the congressional preference for resolving midterm contract disputes
through arbitration.
The question remains whether it would be sufficient for enforcing the
agreement of a union and an employer to arbitrate all unfair labor practice claimsS• 294
when such enforcement would hold each party to the bargain it made. Unions,
of course, can waive substantive § 7 rights of the employees they represent,
295including the archetype § 7 right to strike. So long as the union does not
breach its duty of fair representation, its waiver authority is extensive.296 Since a
union can waive the rights of the individuals it represents to file lawsuits to
vindicate their rights under all of the antidiscrimination statutes, it doubtfully
would breach its duty of fair representation by extending the agreement to
arbitrate to all unfair labor practice claims.
The Board will not defer to arbitration in this circumstance. It predictably
will treat collectively bargained agreements to arbitrate all unfair labor practice
292. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49; Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act §§ 206(d), 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 173(d), 185(a) (2006).
293. Such employer unfair labor practices are the subjects of contemporary litigation before
the Board. See, e.g., Trump Marina Assocs., LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 107 (2010) (rule
restricting media contact), enforced, Nos. 10-261, 10-1286, 2011 WL 2118278 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Brighton Rental Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. No. 62, at *1 (2009) (two-member Board) (interrogation
whether employees planned to file lawsuit); Frances House, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 516, 522 (1996)
(interrogation about protest letter).
294. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
295. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)).
296. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (2009) (quoting Commc'ns
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739 (1988)).
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claims in exactly the way it treats individual employees' agreements to do so.
297
In other words, the Board will agree with the Supreme Court's declaration in 14
Penn Plaza that the law draws no distinction between the two,298 although under
the NLRA they both will be unenforceable-and unlawful.
From the premise that it is unlawful for a collectively bargained agreement
to provide for the arbitration of statutory claims including all unfair labor
practice claims,299 two conclusions would seem to follow. First, the difference
in bargaining power between individuals and unions would not explain the
Board's finding to be unlawful agreements between employers and individual
employees to arbitrate unfair labor practice claims. Second, the explanation for
condemning both collectively bargained and individual agreements that require
the arbitration of all unfair labor practice claims cannot reside in an inherent
inability to waive a § 7 right. In addition to these two conclusions, the Board's
respect for collectively bargained agreements to arbitrate unfair labor practice
claims that coincide with or depend upon the resolution of contract claims
supports a third conclusion. For policy reasons that it considers to be sufficient,
the Board is able to distinguish between itself as forum and other § 7 rights.
J. The Real Rationale for Rejecting Gilmer
From the preceding process of elimination emerges a hypothesis about the
real explanation for the Board's refusal to accept the analytical framework that
the Supreme Court has adopted in relation to the arbitration of other statutory
claims. That explanation has both doctrinal and practical elements. On the
doctrinal front, the Board can invoke numerous Supreme Court pronouncements
stressing the Board's public, as opposed to private, mission and responsibility.
For example, in 1940, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[t]he Board asserts a
public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the
duty of preventing unfair labor practices. ' 3°  The Supreme Court echoed the
same refrain when it said that "[t]he public interest in effectuating the policies of
the federal labor laws, not the wrong done the individual employee, is always the
Board's principal concern., 30 1 As late as 1968, it again declared that "[a]
proceeding by the Board is not to adjudicate private rights but to effectuate a
public policy." 302 The Board also can invoke the Supreme Court's statements
that its public mission to enforce public rights means that Congress intended
297. See, e.g., San Juan Bautista Med. Ctr., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 102, slip op. at 2-3 (Feb. 28,
2011) (finding that deferral to arbitration was inappropriate because resolution of an unfair labor
practice claim did not require interpretation of contract).
298. See 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.
299. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527,
528 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (interpreting such an agreement).
300. Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
301. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 n.8 (1967).
302. NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968).
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employees to be "completely free from coercion" against filing charges with it
30 3
and that "the overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the
only healthy alternative. ' ' 304 Based on these public rights-unfettered access
pronouncements-the Board concludes that its responsibility as a public
institution enforcing public rights is not to tolerate, indeed to condemn, any
private agreement to subject public right issues to arbitration-a dispute
resolution mechanism designed to vindicate private rights.
30 5
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on which the Board relies should be
placed in historical context. They were articulated in an era when "New Deal"
agencies, like the NLRB, were in their nascence and undergoing a variety of
challenges based on inconsistencies between agency rulings and private law
principles. 3°6 In the arbitration context, that dichotomy persisted and formed the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.307 In
that decision, the Court ruled that the public rights embodied in Title VII
prevailed over the private law principles of election of remedies and waiver, as
well as an arbitrator's determination of whether an employer had violated the
private rights contained in the anti-discrimination provision of a collective
bargaining agreement. 308 More basically, arbitrators commissioned to decide
private rights are not equipped to decide claims under Title VII because that
statute's "broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to
public law concepts.
303. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1972) (quoting Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n,
389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967)).
304. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. at 424.
305. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375 (2006), enforced, 255 F. App'x 527, 528 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); see also Nat'l Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 534 (1972) (Members Fanning and Jenkins
dissenting), overruled in part by Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), overruled by
United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
306. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1944) (reasoning that individual
agreements enforceable under private law principles cannot survive Board decision that they
conflict with the NLRA insofar as they limit or forestall collective bargaining rights, or waive
benefits under collective agreement because the Board is a public body enforcing public rights in
the public interest); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 91-93 (1943) (concluding that because the
SEC acts in the public interest, it could have adopted a rule to protect investors and consumers that
goes beyond the requirements of private law fiduciary obligations); Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB,
309 U.S. 350, 361-63 (1940) (explaining that the Board is not bound by private law requirements of
in personam jurisdiction and party joinder that would bar courts from adjudicating contract rights in
absence of the other party to the contract because it enforces public rights and thus may invalidate
an employer's unlawfully procured contract with individual employees who were not parties to
proceeding); see also FCC v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 239, 248 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (noting the inherent dichotomy between the roles of courts and administrative agencies,
with the former being primarily focused on enforcing private rights and the latter being primarily
focused on enforcing public rights).
307. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
308. See id. at 49-51, 57.
309. Id. at 57.
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More recently, however, the Supreme Court has abandoned, indeed rejected
as unsound, this dichotomy between public and private rights. If employees
effectively can vindicate their statutory claims in arbitration-and that routinely
occurs despite arbitration's less expensive and more truncated process-then an
arbitrator's enforcement of an individual's statutory right is the enforcement of a
public right no less than a federal court's enforcement of the same statutory right
is.310 If the public-private rights dichotomy is unsound when the forum contest
is between arbitration and the courts, it would be equally unsound when
arbitration and the NLRB are the competing fora.
The Supreme Court rejected the public versus private rights dichotomy in
the context of enforcing agreements to arbitrate statutory claims under the terms
of the FAA. Because by its terms the FAA does not apply to administrative
agencies, and the Court's conceptual change emerged in cases that were decided
under the FAA and addressed the judiciary's relationship to arbitration, the
Board has ignored that "radical change. ' 311 It thereby can cling to the public-
private rights dichotomy, relying on the much older, but never overruled,
Supreme Court pronouncements that the Board enforces public rights and has a
public mission.312 From this perspective, the Board can characterize arbitration
as a private mechanism for enforcing private rights-even when arbitrators are
clearly commissioned to decide NLRA claims-and disregard the Court's more
recent observation that arbitrators deciding private grievants' statutory claims
necessarily enforce public rights.31 3 In sum, thus freed to rely on an otherwise
outdated (if ever sound) dichotomy, the Board continues to envision itself to be
the indispensable protector of public rights, and thus, the exclusive forum for
resolving unfair labor practice claims. To put it another way, the Board's
public mission and reason for being are to resolve unfair labor practice claims,
and it will not relinquish that role to a private arbitration process except in the
310. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (recognizing
that so long as a statutory right may be properly vindicated in an arbitral forum, the statutory
purpose is served, even when the statute was designed to further important social policies); Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991) (recognizing that the arbitral forum is
proper for resolving an ADEA claim because, like the judicial process, the arbitration process
resolves specific disputes between parties and thereby can serve a broader public purpose);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) ("And so long
as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.").
311. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009) (noting a "radical change, over
two decades, in the Court's receptivity to arbitration" (quoting Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv.
Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77 (1998))).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 300-304.
313. See supra text accompanying note 310.
314. See Lexington Cartage Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 713 F.2d 194, 195 (6th Cir. 1983)
(citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 48 (1938)).
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limited circumstance when contract issues under a private collective bargaining
agreement happen to overlap with unfair labor practice issues.
3 15
So much for the doctrinal basis for the Board's position, but that position has
an unarticulated practical dimension that may be especially important today.
During the same decades when the Supreme Court was engaged in the process of
radically revising its view of the adequacy of arbitration in relation to statutory
issues, the Board's caseload and impact, and in turn its relevancy, were eroding.
After reaching a high of 44,063 in fiscal year 1980, the Board's unfair labor
practice case intake continually has shrunken, falling to 33,833 in 1990, 29,188
in 2000, and numbering only 23,523 in fiscal year 2010.
316
Far from taking up the slack, the Board's other responsibility, to conduct
union representation elections, has experienced a similar contraction. In fiscal
year 1980, the Board conducted 7,296 representation elections-excluding
decertification elections-involving 478,821 employees and had a total intake of
representation cases-excluding decertification petitions-of 10,622.317 In fiscal
year 1990, it conducted 3,623 such elections involving 231,069 employees and
had a representation case intake of 6,005 .318 In fiscal year 2000, the number of
representation elections fell to 2,988, the number of eligible voters declined very
slightly to 235,857, and the number of cases received dropped to 4,756.319 In
fiscal year 2010, the Board appears to have conducted only 1,584 representation
elections involving only about 98,180 eligible voters and had a representation
case intake of 2,447. In sum, during the three decades between 1980 and
315. See supra text accompanying notes 288-298. In Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247
N.L.R.B. 146, 146-47 (1980), overruled by Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), the Board
abandoned a deferral position which "forces employees in [collectively bargained] arbitration
proceeding[s] to seek simultaneous vindication of private contractual rights and public statutory
rights or risk waiving the latter." Although Suburban Motor Freight was overruled in Olin Corp.,
the quoted position presumably survives when the absence of overlap between contractual and
statutory rights removes the opportunity for simultaneous vindication.
316. 65 NLRB ANN. REP. app. at 129 tbl.1 (2000); 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 134 tbl.l (1990); 45
NLRB ANN. REP. 240 tbl.1 (1980). There is no Annual Report for fiscal year 2010 because the
Board's Seventy Fourth Annual Report, for fiscal year 2009 was its last; however, the Board
advises that the statistical information that would have been reported in that Annual Report appears
in the Graphs & Data section of its website, under the sub-heading Charges and Complaints.
Annual Reports, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/annual-reports (last visited July 7, 2011). The figure,
23,523, in the text for fiscal year 2010 appears in that website section. Graphs & Data, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/chartsdata/chargeComp#chartltag (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). However, a
memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel reports that the number of charges filed in
fiscal year 2010 was 23,381. Memorandum GC 11-03 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen.
Counsel, NLRB, to Emps., Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2010) 2 (Jan. 10, 2011), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/general-counsel-memos.
317. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 242 tbl.lB, 270-72 tbl.13 (1980).
318. 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 136 tbl.lB, 168-69 tbl.13 (1990).
319. 65 NLRB ANN. REP. app. tbls.IB & 13 (2000).
320. There is no NLRB Annual Report for fiscal year 2010. See supra note 316. The figures,
1,584 and 2,447, in the text for the number of elections and representation case intake in fiscal
2010, respectively, are the sum of the numbers of RC and RM elections and petitions in the Graphs
& Data section of the NLRB's website. Graphs & Data, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/chartsdata/
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2010, the Board's unfair labor practice function has declined by nearly 50% and
its representation elections function has declined by 80% if measured by eligible
voters, about 70% if measured by number of elections, and about 67% if
measured by case intake.
Although the NLRA applies broadly in the nonunion workplace when no
union organizing activity is ongoing, the decline in the Board's unfair labor
practice and election workloads parallels the shrinkage of union membership in
the private sector workforce. From about 35% in 1955, to about 25% in 1975, to
nearly 15% in 1985, to approximately 10% in 1995, and down to 7.8% in 2005,
today, union density is only 6.9% percent of the private sector workforce.
321
That figure, which borders on statistical insignificance, approximates private
sector union density at the turn of the twentieth century,322 thirty-five years
before the original NLRA-with its avowed Depression-combative purpose to
323promote collective bargaining-was enacted.
With regard to the Board's relevancy, during that thirty-year period between
1980 and 2010 when the number of charges filed dropped by nearly 50%, and
the number of petitions, representation elections, and voters declined by about
67%, 70%, and 80% respectively, the size of the private sector workforce in the
petitions#chart9tag (last visited July 7, 2011); Graphs & Data, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/charts
data/petitions#chartl Itag (last visited July 7, 2011). The Graphs & Data section, however, does not
contain the number of eligible voters in these elections, a number which can be calculated only by
adding the numbers of eligible voters in election data summaries in another section of the Board's
website. NLRB ELECTION REPORT, Six MONTHS SUMMARY: OCT. 2009 THROUGH MAR. 2010, at
11 tbl.1 (Apr. 12, 2010), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
182/ermar2010.pdf; NLRB ELECTION REPORT, SIX MONTHS SUMMARY: APR. 2010 THROUGH
SEPT. 2010, at 12 tbl.1 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/182/ersept2OlO.pdf. Those reports, however, list the total number of RC and RM
elections in fiscal 2010 as 1,557, not 1,584 as the Graphs & Data election section states.
Consequently, the number of eligible voters in 1,584 elections is a proportional estimate based on
the 96,507 eligible voters in 1,557 elections reported in the six-months summaries. Finally, the
Acting General Counsel states that 1,790 initial representation elections were conducted in fiscal
2010. Memorandum GC 11-03 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Emps.,
Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2010) 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/
publications/general-counsel-memos. The source of that discordant figure is unknown.
321. US Private Sector Trade Union Membership, PUB. PURPOSE, http://www.public
purpose.com/lm-unn2003.htm (last visited March 31, 2011); Union Membership in the Private
Sector, DATA360 (May, 16, 2008), http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data-Set-Groupjd=1387;
Union Affiliation by Occupation and Industry, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpslutab3.htm (check the box corresponding to percent
of union members in private sector; then follow "Retrieve data" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 5,
2011). Because the first source does not have the private sector union density for 1975, an
approximate of 28.5% is calculated from the 1974 and 1976 data. The second source shows a
density of 21.5% for 1975. Averaging the figures from these two sources, the private sector union
density in 1975 was approximately 25%.
322. See US Private Sector Trade Union Membership, supra note 321 (showing that the
private sector union density in 1900 was 6.5%).
323. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 196, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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United States increased by about 45%.324 It may be too much to expect any
administrative agency, even in the best of times, to cede any important public
interest work to private alternative dispute resolution. But, the Board is fighting
for its institutional life and its relevancy (or at least its budget) in contemporary
society. In view of its survival mode, the Board cannot afford to permit
arbitration agreements to have any impact on the number of cases it will have an
opportunity to resolve. In other words, despite, or because of, the change in
times, the Board cannot let go of the public rights-public mission doctrine or buy
into the Supreme Court's arbitration-supportive dissolution of the public rights-
private rights dichotomy.
II. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS COVERING OTHER STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. The Concerted Activity Right and Arbitration Agreements' Class Action
or Class Grievance Ban
1. The Concerted Activity Challenge
Even if an arbitration agreement that covers statutory claims makes an
exception for NLRA claims, as the Board's U-Haul decision requires, 325 that
agreement still faces an NLRA challenge. The challenge's dialectic starts with
the major premise that employees are engaged in activity protected by § 7 when
they act in concert to file lawsuits or grievances that seek to improve their
compensation or terms or conditions of employment, including those invoking
the FLSA, Title VII, Section 1981, the ADA, the ADEA, or other federal or state
statutes related to employment. 326 The minor premise posits that § 7 confers the
right to bring class action, or in the case of the FLSA, "collective action"
lawsuits, because these litigation modes are a form of concerted activity.
327
Because agreements to arbitrate statutory claims necessarily preclude class
action or collective action lawsuits, the dialectic concludes, they prevent
employees from exercising their § 7 right to file suit on a class or collective basis
and thus violate § 8(a)(1). 328  Although an arbitration agreement may not
mention class or collective actions, it still has an unlawful chilling effect because
employees at least would reasonably understand the agreement to bar class and
324. See B-1. Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls by Major Industry Sector, 1961 to Date,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/2011/ces/tablebl-2011lO.pdf (last
visited Nov. 7, 2011).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 5-14.
326. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Michael Cuda, No. 12-CA-25764, 2011 WL 11194, at *4
(NLRB Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2011) (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-67 (1978)).
327. See id. (citing Harco Trucking, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 478 (2005); U Ocean Palace Pavilion,
Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1173 (2005)).
328. See id. at *4-5 (rejecting the argument).
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collective litigation.329 If the agreement does expressly bar class or collective
actions, as well as class grievances, it is unlawful for the additional reason that it
precludes class-based challenges in any forum.
330
2. The General Counsel's Dilemma and Equivocation
Although the forgoing argument has been advanced in the academic
literature, 33 in June 2010 the NLRB's then General Counsel took a more
nuanced, albeit somewhat equivocal, position.332 He observes, quite correctly,
that a lawsuit styled as a class, or collective, action or even a grievance styled as
class grievance, does not, without more, meet the concerted activity requirement
for § 7 protection. 333 Well aware that an employee acting alone may include a
class allegation in order to gain litigation settlement leverage vis-d-vis the
employer, the General Counsel notes that such an allegation does not necessarily
bespeak concerted activity.334 (It also does not guarantee satisfaction of § 7's
"mutual aid or protection" requirement.) 335 The General Counsel concedes that
if an agreement clearly precludes class litigation, the Board could find that it is
unlawful because it prohibits some class litigation that is concerted and protected
336activity. Under the chilling effect theory, if employees could reasonably
interpret a mandatory arbitration agreement to bar class actions or grievances
that constitute concerted activity, as they might, invalidity also would seem to
follow.337  Nevertheless, the NLRB's General Counsel opines that even an
arbitration agreement that expressly precludes class actions and class grievances
is not by its terms unlawful, so long as said ban covers only the "pursuit of
purely personal individual claims.
' 338
329. See id.(acknowledging and accepting the chilling effect argument only in relation to
coverage of unfair labor practice claims).
330. This is the scenario in D. R. Horton, Inc., that is currently pending before the Board. See
Notice & Invitation to File Briefs, Case 12-CA-25764, 2011 WL 2451721 (June 16, 2011).
331. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7
Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 173, 204-30 (2003).
332. See Memorandum GC 10-06 from Ronald Meisburg, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to all Reg'l
Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Guideline Memorandum Concerning Unfair Labor
Practice Charges Involving Employee Waivers in the Context of Employers' Mandatory Arbitration
Policies (June 16, 2010), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/publications/general-counsel-memos.
333. See id. at 3-4.
334. See id.
335. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). See, e.g., Holling
Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 301-04 (2004).
336. Meisburg, supra note 332, at 3-4.
337. Id. at 4.
338. Id. at 6. Although the General Counsel includes as per se lawful, arbitration agreements
that preclude class grievances, id., that proposition may be perceived to be a closer question because
a prohibition on class grievances not only waives a judicial forum but also precludes a form of
concerted activity to enforce employment-related rights in the only other forum available. It is
eminently sensible, however, for arbitration agreements to preclude class grievances due to "the
fundamental changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action
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Of course, virtually all Gilmer-type arbitration agreements that preclude
litigation under employment statutes ban litigation in pursuit of both individual
claims and class actions, without distinguishing between the two. 339 When they
specifically bar class litigation, they do not draw any distinction between class
actions in pursuit of individual claims and other class actions. 340 Similarly, a ban
on class grievances presumably would not draw that distinction. The issue is
whether every employer with a Gilmer-sanctioned arbitration agreement must
recast the ban, so as to remove from its scope the prosecution of class actions or
grievances that do constitute § 7-protected concerted activity.
On this issue, the NLRB's General Counsel is equivocal. On the one hand,
he cautions that "a mandatory arbitration agreement that prohibits all class action
grievances and lawsuits necessarily inhibits some protected activity" and advises
that "[p]ossible modifications for remedying an overly broad mandatory
arbitration agreement would include" adding language specifying that the
arbitration agreement "does not constitute a waiver of employees' collective
rights under Section 7 ... concertedly to pursue any covered claim before a state
or federal court on a class, collective, or joint action basis. '  On the other
hand, he opines that § 7 does not require a different outcome than the courts of
appeals, which have held "that employment agreements that require the
employee to waive the filing of class or collective claims both in court and in the
employer's arbitration procedure are not per se unenforceable.
342
The General Counsel's equivocation reflects an attempt to navigate between
the Scylla of the Board's unlawful-condition and chilling effect principles and
the Charybdis of the courts' predictable disinclination to permit those principles
to condemn arbitration agreements enforceable under the FAA. That is, if the
Board were to find an arbitration agreement unlawful on the ground that it
precludes, or reasonably could be understood to preclude, some concerted class
actions or class grievances to vindicate rights under Title VII, the ADA, the
ADEA, or other statutes, the Board would eviscerate Gilmer and create a large
exception to the FAA that it does not contain. It is one thing for the Board to
declare arbitration agreements unlawful when they encompass claims under the
NLRA, given that the FAA does not strictly apply to the Board and the public
mission-public rights characterizations of the Board's responsibilities remain on
arbitration." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010). Because
class arbitration radically changes the nature of a procedure hallmarked by informality, expedition,
limited discovery, and relatively low cost, the impermissibility of class grievances is the default
position when the agreement is silent. Id. at 1775-76.
339. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing an arbitration agreement between an employee and employer that banned litigation in
court, but did not distinguish between individual and class action claims).
340. See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir.
2007) (discussing an arbitration agreement that specifically barred class litigation but did not
distinguish between class actions in pursuit of individual claims and other class actions).
341. Meisburg, supra note 332, at 4-5.
342. Id. at 5.
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the books. However, it is quite another thing for the Board to declare unlawful
all arbitration agreements, including those that cover any and all statutory claims
the Board has no authority to entertain, because the agreements do not expressly
permit class actions, the very kind of litigation over which arbitration is the most
attractive alternative.
Regarding a Board rule requiring explicit allowance of class grievances in
order to avoid unenforceability, the Supreme Court ruled that the FAA preempts
a similar California law explicitly requiring the allowance of class grievances in
order to avoid unenforceability on unconscionability grounds. 343 "Requiring the
availability of classwide arbitration," the Court reasoned, "interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with
the FAA." 344 Although the FAA does not preempt a provision of another federal
statute, the courts, including the Supreme Court, are unlikely to be any more
tolerant of the Board using the § 7 concerted activity language, and the legal
principles it has developed for other purposes, to accomplish a far broader
interference with the FAA. In other words, from this perspective, the courts will
be very reluctant to marginalize Gilmer by letting the NLRA tail wag the
alternative dispute resolution dog. That reluctance is predictable for reasons
more fundamental than any reasons the General Counsel seems to have had in
mind.
B. The Right to Class Action Prophylaxis
Preliminarily, a semantic problem plagues the terms "concerted activities"
and "class" or "collective" actions. Despite some linguistic similarity, these
terms are neither synonymous nor equivalent. In their respective statutory
schemes, the terms have quite different meanings, and using them
interchangeably bespeaks a logical and legal fallacy. Employees have a § 7 right
to act concertedly to file and try to prosecute lawsuits and grievances on a class
or non-class basis to improve their lot as employees, 345 but they have no more of
a § 7 right to prevail on the class certification or class grievance issue than they
have to win on the merits. 346 More specifically, employees who sign Gilmer-
authorized arbitration agreements that ban litigation, including class litigation as
well as class grievances, have no § 7 right to a ruling by a court or arbitrator that
they may maintain such class-based actions whenever they are pursued
concertedly. 347 As the General Counsel notes, they have a § 7 right not to be
discharged, disciplined, or otherwise retaliated against for acting in concert to
bring a class action lawsuit or a class grievance in the face of a contractual ban,
343. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
344. Id. at 1748.
345. See generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1978).
346. Meisberg, supra note 332, at 4.
347. Id.
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and a § 7 right to challenge the enforceability of the ban. 348 But, it is quite a
different proposition to suggest that § 7 confers on employees any right to
success before a court or arbitrator in their effort to be relieved from an
otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement disallowing class actions and class
grievances that do or may constitute protected, concerted activity.
349
From another perspective, an agreement to arbitrate rather than litigate, and
to arbitrate only on an individual basis, does not mean that employees cannot act
in concert with their coworkers when they pursue individual grievances. Rather,
it limits only the scope of discovery, the hearing, the remedy, and the employee
population bound by an adverse decision on the merits. Section 7 would not
seem to give employees any incremental advantage, much less a right to prevail,
in a class certification proceeding governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 35 or state law counterparts, the opt-in procedure for collective
actions under the FLSA, or an arbitration hearing on the contractual
permissibility of class grievances.3
It may be argued that although § 7 does not assure employees victory in a
court contest, to determine whether they can maintain a class action under Rule
23 or an arbitration contest over whether they can maintain a class grievance, an
employer should not be able to prevail by extracting an agreement barring class
claims. This argument rests on three assumptions. First, it assumes that § 7
prescribes a litigation/arbitration default position wherein employees have an a
priori right to choose the forum and prosecute the claims however they wish.
Second, it assumes that the employer's opportunity to avoid the default position
is limited to the defenses prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or,
in the case of grievances, to non-contractual arguments to the arbitrator. Third, it
assumes that a contractual ban on class actions or grievances can be separated
from the arbitration agreement of which it is a part and thereby be assimilated to
the category of unlawful contractual waivers of § 7 rights. None of these
assumptions seem well founded.
Section 7 creates a major exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, but
it prescribes no default position for employees who become embroiled in
348. Id. at 6.
349. The General Counsel also acknowledged that an employer may defend against a class
action or class grievance on the ground that it is impermissible under the arbitration agreement. Id.
at 5. If the class action or grievance reflects concerted activity and the employer is nonetheless
successful in its defense, the court's or arbitrator's ruling may be reasonably understood by
employees to make future class actions or grievances not worth the candle; yet it would be difficult
for the Board to conclude that the court's or arbitrator's decision is unlawful on chilling effect
grounds unless the employer includes an addendum specifying that the ruling has no effect on the
§ 7 right to pursue concerted class actions. Passivity following a court's or arbitrator's ruling does
not easily fall within the ambit of § 8(a)(1)'s ban on coercion, restraint or interference with the
exercise of § 7 rights.
350. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
351. See, e.g., Meisburg, supra note 332, at 4 (stating that for § 7 claims, employees may
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litigation or arbitration with their employer over claimed abridgements of rights
conferred by other statutes. Although the right to engage in concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection immunizes from discharge or other discipline two
workers who jointly pressure their employer to rescind discretionary decisions
by different supervisors not to promote them, § 7 does nothing to help them
satisfy Rule 23's numerosity or commonality requirements if they choose to file
a class action under Title VII or another anti-discrimination statute.
Nor was the NLRA designed to reduce an employer's defenses to class
action allegations in litigation of non-NLRA claims to those available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The FAA is no less a part of the surrounding
legal landscape and no less beyond the purview of § 8(a)(1) than the
jurisdictional and venue provisions, the civil procedure rules, or the employer's
defenses on the merits. Indeed, the original version of the FAA was enacted in
1925, 352 a decade before the original NLRA, when its §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) became
law 353 and twelve years before Rule 23 was adopted in its original form.354 The
Board's exemption from the FAA is irrelevant. That exemption applies only
when the agreement substitutes arbitration for the Board as the forum for
resolving unfair labor practice claims and exists only because the FAA, by its
terms, does not apply to administrative agencies' adjudication of claims they
were created to resolve and because the Board is unwilling (and cannot afford) to
relinquish its public interest-public mission hold on the resolution of unfair labor
practice claims.
355
Although a stand-alone agreement between an employer and individual
employees that precludes class actions may be vulnerable to challenge, what is at
issue is an arbitration agreement that bans class actions, class grievances, or
both. As noted above, the Supreme Court recently held that a California law
invalidating arbitration agreements' ban on class grievances was incompatible
with the FAA.3 56 The plaintiff had argued that the invalidation reflected an
independent, consumer-protective principle of state contract law applicable to all
contracts, not just arbitration agreements, and as such, should survive. 357 The
§§ 7 and 8(a)(1) challenge to a class action ban, class grievance ban, or both,
similarly posits that the employee-protective § 7 right is free standing and that
any restrictions are invalid, regardless of the kind of contract in which they are
found. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the attempt to separate the class
grievance ban from the arbitration agreement of which it is a part, explaining that
"[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3 and 4, is to
ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as
352. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
353. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 196, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
354. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes.
355. See supra Part I.
356. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
357. Id. at 1746-47.
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to facilitate streamlined proceedings.'"358 Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA fully
apply to arbitration agreements covering claims under employment statutes other
than the NLRA.359  Separating out class action bans from the arbitration
agreements, of which they are a functional part, in order to invalidate, or in the
case of §§ 7 and 8(a)(1), outlaw them, seems to be the same kind of arbitration-
frustrating contrivance that failed to persuade the Supreme Court.
The fact that an employer must act early and proactively to obtain an
enforceable arbitration agreement in order to avail itself of an FAA defense to
class litigation, no more impugns the validity of that defense than the employer's
acting proactively and early-for example to limit the number of employees
subject to the arbitration agreement, or to create differences in the compensation
scheme or terms and conditions of employment, or to make promotional
decisions discretionary with local managers-undermines the validity of the
defense such prophylactic action gives to the employer on Rule 23's numerosity,
commonality, typicality and, in the case of individualized monetary claims,
predominance issues.360 For the same reason, an employer's prophylactic
limitation of its dollar volume of business does not diminish the validity of its
defense to the Board's jurisdiction, and its prophylactic promotion of employees
to supervisory status does not diminish its defense to the employees' putative
claims that they were disciplined for the exercise of § 7 rights.
All of these proactive defenses at the planning stage have obvious
downsides. The arbitration agreement is no exception. It would be nafve to
suppose that an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims is a costless equivalent to
the promulgation of a disciplinary rule, such as a no-solicitation or no-insignia
rule. An arbitration agreement binds the employer as much as the employee, and
although arbitration is less expensive than litigation as a forum in which to
resolve statutory claims, for this same reason, it also exposes the employer to
many more grievances than the number of lawsuits it otherwise might face. If the
arbitration agreement is sufficiently onerous and unfair to the employee, the
employer risks a declaration of unenforceability on unconscionability grounds.
The bottom line is that if the employer is willing to accept the disadvantages and
the risks, an arbitration agreement the employer enters into under the auspices of
the FAA is a litigation defense that is beyond the purview of §§ 7 and 8(a)(1).
C. Strikes over Arbitrable Claims
If an FAA-enforceable arbitration agreement covers statutory claims, a final
issue remains under the NLRA-whether § 7 protection extends to a strike in
358. Id. at 1748 (emphasis added).
359. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
360. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547, 2552-53 (2011) (finding that
the commonality requirement was not met for employees' class action sex discrimination case
where pay and promotional decisions were left to the broad discretion of local managers).
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support of a statutory claim that employees are obliged to arbitrate. A union's
agreement to arbitrate implies a promise not to strike over arbitrable
grievances. 361 Is the same no-strike implication warranted in the case of an
individual employee's agreement to arbitrate?
The answer almost certainly is no. The implication of a no-strike clause
from an agreement to arbitrate has an origin peculiar to specific enforcement of
the arbitration and no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements. By its
terms the Norris-LaGuardia Act would bar a federal court from specifically
enforcing an employer's promise to arbitrate union grievances as well as a
union's promise not to strike.362 The Supreme Court adopted the shorthand
explanation that a no-strike clause is the quid pro quo for the agreement to
arbitrate in order to limit the judicially created exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to what was necessary to further the pro-arbitration policy contained in the
Taft-Hartley Act. 363 Implying a non-existent no-strike clause from an arbitration
provision, however, stretched that fictional quid pro quo construct beyond its
original purpose and collided with the bedrock policy of free collective
bargaining without government interference with the terms of the bargain. The
implication can be explained only by a policy of resolving all doubts in favor of
an interpretation that ensures industrial peace.36 That interpretation is peculiar
to collective bargaining agreements and the policy of minimizing labor strife.
There would seem to be little basis for inferring an agreement not to strike in
employers' agreements with individual employees to arbitrate statutory claims.
After all, such agreements are designed to make arbitration the alternative to
litigation, not to strikes.
What would be the result if the agreement to arbitrate statutory claims
expressly included a no-strike clause? The Board's approach to this question
probably would start from the premise that an agreement between an employer
and individual employees cannot bar the employees from exercising the basic § 7
right to strike and conclude that the addition of an agreement to arbitrate should
not change that result. 365  A no-strike ban, unlike a class arbitration ban, is
difficult to characterize as an integral part of an arbitration agreement or as
designed to further arbitration's simplicity and inexpensiveness attributes. From
361. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974)
(stating that absent an express agreement to the contrary, an arbitration agreement contains an
implied obligation not to strike (citing Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105
(1962))).
362. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2006).
363. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247-53 (1970); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455, 458-59 (1957).
364. See, e.g., Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (referring to the "federal policy that federal
courts should enforce [arbitration] agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that
industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.").
365. Cf. Meisburg, supra note 332, at 2 (noting that employees cannot waive their § 7 rights to
concertedly challenge the validity of the agreements through class or collective actions seeking to
enforce their employment rights).
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a different perspective, unions are able to waive employees' right to strike
because otherwise they could not negotiate meaningful concessions for the
employees they represent. However, individual employees have no such
collective bargaining authority or responsibility.
What about freedom of contract? Is that basic principle operative only for
unions and employers, but not for individual employees who are unrepresented
by a union? As long as employees can extricate themselves from their individual
contracts by selecting a union to bargain for them, why should individual
employees not be able to negotiate for themselves with their employer on the
same subjects, including grievance and arbitration procedures and no-strike
clauses? Isn't unrepresented employees' negotiation of individual contracts with
their employer an exercise of the right to refrain from union activity and
representation that the Taft-Hartley Amendment added to § 7 and placed on an
equal footing with the right to opt for union representation and collective
bargaining?
These issues are beyond the scope of this article, although they deserve
careful re-examination on another day. For the present, it will have to suffice
that the Board almost certainly will take the position that the issues are not
presented when the employer extracts a promise not to strike as a condition of
employment, for in that circumstance the employer essentially exacts the waiver
of the archetype § 7 right as the price for employment or continued employment.
The more difficult issue is whether in a bargained-for-exchange an employee
who does not have to relinquish any § 7 right to obtain or keep a job should be
able to promise not to strike for a reasonable and limited period of time--or by
operation of law until an exclusive collective bargaining representative is
selected-in exchange for something of value, such as a 10% salary increment.
Adding an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims to the mix seems neither to
create any policy tension between the FAA and the NLRA nor to change what is
a rather different analysis.
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